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Coming Next Month...

THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY

July, 1960

Our July issue is devoted to a study of the American economy. Will economic issues influence the presidential elections? What are the weak spots in the economy? Seven contributors will discuss these questions and others like them in the following articles:

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THE BUDGET AND NATIONAL SECURITY by *James R. Schlesinger*, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, and author of "The Political Economy of National Security";

TAXES AND A BALANCED BUDGET by *William N. Leonard*, Hofstra College;

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THE RISE OF THE GIANT UNION by *Mark Starr*, Educational Director, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, and author of "Labor and the American Way";

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THE EXPANDING COSTS OF THE WELFARE STATE by *Robert E. Hill*, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Illinois.

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How strong is the United Nations? Is it an effective agency for guaranteeing the peace and thus the security of the Free World? The answer to these questions may be found, in part, in a historical review of United Nations effectiveness in dealing with crisis situations. As our introductory article points out, the United Nations "is not, and is not likely to become, an effective agency of coercion; it does not, and cannot, contribute very much to the settlement of disputes. . . ." Indeed, in this view, "the traditional 'first items' of international organization—those of security and disarmament—are frail reeds upon which to rest the future of the United Nations." Nonetheless, the United Nations can play a strong and effective role in relieving international tensions.

Can We Count on the United Nations?

By ROSS N. BERKES

*Director of the School of International Relations,
University of Southern California*

IT IS nearly always foolish to write glowingly about the United Nations. Generally this amounts to little more than a sort of pointing to words with words, and ultimately the seemingly endless wordiness of it all leads to disappointment and disillusionment. Specific problems are framed in terms of principle and despatched in the language of conscience and responsibility, often to return unresolved within the year—and unaffected, except possibly adversely, by United Nations action. It is no great achievement to believe in peace and disarmament, in justice and law, in technical cooperation and economic assistance, in human rights and national self-determination. Achievement rests in the practical implementation of such propositions.

The United Nations, like the League before it, is geared to generalizations of considerable artificiality, however attractive, and must deal with particulars in terms of these abstractions, however impractically. The

increasing role and importance of the Secretary-General is only in part a tribute to the capability and skill of the person—for the rest, it is a compensatory response of the United Nations itself for its own awkward inflexibilities.

There is, if one may dare mention it, a built-in sterility about many of the actions of a society of self-interested states trying to operate in terms of moral principle. Appeals and resolutions on behalf of right vs. wrong—the "stand and be counted" orientation of so much of the United Nations' business—are more inevitable than they are rewarding. In any case, they do seem inevitable, as illustrated by the speech to the General Assembly made by Guinea's President, Sékou Touré, on November 5, 1959. Expressing a dislike for the tugging and pulling on behalf of Africa's loyalty in the East-West rivalry, President Touré took his own offensive, stating to both blocs that "we must put the question which we consider as funda-

mental and of paramount importance: 'Yes or no, are you for the liberation of Africa?"'

President Touré's challenge becomes a somewhat incidental example of another characteristic of United Nations behavior—the tilting of a general proposition in the direction of a particular focus. Sekou Touré, whatever his merits as a principled statesman, expressed no concern for the principle of freedom *per se*. The pressing, overweening preoccupation was freedom for Africa. Yet there is nothing unique in such particularization of a general proposition. It even succeeded in making its appearance in the draft covenant of human rights—presumably the essence of lofty generalization. Much to the surprise of some, the first—and first to be approved—article of this emergent covenant pertained to the right of self-determination, and with express and particular focus on the peoples of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories. The version of the Afro-Asian powers, as drafted, would have been even more specific and exclusive, insofar as paragraph three of the draft had proposed the following stipulation:

The States parties to the Covenant having responsibilities for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories shall promote the right of self-determination in such territories in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Particularist Policies

It would be wrong to imply by these illustrations that only the Afro-Asian powers are particularist, for much of American policy on behalf of general United Nations principles has been particularly directed against the Communist world. This was typified by American interest, early in the 1950's, in what otherwise was the general problem of slave labor, but which was limited exclusively to the exposé of slave labor in the Communist world. Even more, our sensitivity to the formulas of democratic life, such as free elections, expresses itself most particularly—one is tempted to say almost exclusively—with reference to areas under Communist domination.

But all of this is observation rather than criticism, and is intended merely to convey some of the complexities in the handling of United Nations business. More especially, it

is to register the appreciation that the advancement of general principles has little to do with their validity as abstractions, and almost everything to do with their worth in a given set of particulars. Such observation is the beginning of political education, and the United Nations is very much a political organization, however futile it may be to point out such an elementary proposition to the more ardent United Nations enthusiasts.

Enough has been said to provide a suitable background for the suggestion that the role of the United Nations in the future, as well as in the past, will have its impractical side. It cannot function without conscience, for its business is the construction and maintenance of an order, and morality lies at the foundation of any order. It cannot function without symbols, futile as they may be (such as the United Nations Special Representative on Hungary) and without people like Sir Leslie Munro to man the symbolic office. "I accepted [the task]," stated Sir Leslie, "because I am convinced that the question of Hungary raises matters of principle which it would not be proper for the United Nations to abandon." Indeed, most of the dramatic, eye-catching business of the United Nations has to do with matters it cannot afford to abandon, however unreachable their solutions.

It is suggested, therefore, that the agendas of United Nations bodies will and must remain a natural attraction for items such as Tibet, Hungary and apartheid, despite even the domestic jurisdiction barrier. And in the nature of the organization, the action taken on such items will continue to be largely ineffective and impractical. Fundamentally, this is a matter of alternative risks: of comparative ineffectiveness or of comparative insensitivity. An international organization can survive and even do a great deal of good by accepting the former; it probably would not survive in terms of the latter.

A persistent image of the United Nations as a coercive organization, leading to judgments of worth based on its effectiveness (or lack of it) in this category, is unfortunate. The proper requirements of coercion include not only a strong moral consensus, but also the will to resort to force and the ability to carry out such decisions. In reality, the

coercion of the United Nations is limited to that of moral suasion. Unfortunately, the quarrels in the United Nations are in most instances far beyond the reach of moral suasion, at least in the short run.

The contemporary attraction of the United Nations Emergency Force has rekindled hopes and perpetuated enthusiasm for a military arm with at least a minimum of policing functions. Certainly it should be conceded that UNEF, in terms of its limited purpose, has been a significant and successful invention. The permanent institutionalization of such a body is a worthwhile objective of real pertinence to the emerging patterns of contemporary world affairs. But the concept of UNEF is rooted in the principle of consent. Its functions cannot exceed what the parties in a dispute are willing to offer it. Within these highly restrictive bounds, a UNEF can perform a very useful role, perhaps even a vital one. In particular, it can help to keep a dispute from becoming inflamed by minimizing both untoward incidents and temptation. But this concept of UNEF does not fulfill the wish for a coercive arm, nor should it. It would surely be fatal to the whole idea to construct a permanent UNEF according to the model of a coercive organ.

All of what has been said so far bears upon one of the fundamental dilemmas of the United Nations: the conflict between the function of moral posture on one hand and that of pacific settlement of disputes on the other. It was precisely this dilemma that led Ambassador Lodge late in 1956 to the construction of an ambivalent resolution on Hungary, one which enabled him to pronounce that the United Nations should "condemn the deed and not the doer." A vigorous denunciation of the acts of brutal repression in Hungary, if not of the perpetrator of these acts, was somehow calculated to preserve for the United Nations a moderating role built on the myth of impartiality. There is an element of silliness here, implicit in the admission that an organization cannot simultaneously go in two different directions without prejudicing its efforts in both. The same lesson was evident in the handling of the Korean War, the several South African questions,¹ and in many of the colonial independence issues that have come before the

United Nations. The silliness, if one may still call it that, does not rest with the actions of member states, but rather with the ambivalent nature of the organization and its own inherent shortcomings.

The U.N. and the Uncommitted Bloc

Enough has been said in minimization of the United Nations in terms of its coercive and settlement functions. Indeed, it might well be anticipated that the peace enforcement and settlement procedures of the organization could play an increasingly important role in world affairs. This is particularly possible—even probable—in relation to the uncommitted states of Asia and Africa now flooding the membership lists of the United Nations. Whether because of or despite the cold war, the United Nations will become increasingly involved in this area of the world. And the conflicts spawned from its weakness and instability will increasingly come to the United Nations for solution. It is because of this area's weaknesses, and of the possibility of a mutuality of advantage in at least a formal self-restraint on the part of the Great Powers, that the role of the United Nations could well be far broader in scope and more critically significant here than in any other area or period in United Nations history.

Except for UNEF, the role of the United Nations in the underdeveloped world has not as yet proceeded beyond the problems of economic and technical assistance and the quarrels with metropolitan powers. While neither of these is likely to decrease for some time to come, more will surely be added to test the resourcefulness of the organization.

Many of the problems of function are affected by current problems of organization in the United Nations, and the latter may require solution before much can be done to improve the former. It can certainly now be said that the most numerous group of states in the United Nations is that representing the underdeveloped countries of the world. Within the next five years new admissions may swell the number of members from the present 82 to 100. Most, and perhaps all, of these new admissions will bear the stamp of newly independent, underdeveloped, and—to be blunt—unprepared

¹ See the U.N. resolution on South Africa p. 360 ff of this issue.

states. While their respective votes will count as much as that of the United States in most organs of the United Nations, they will demand better representation in such bodies as the Security Council and ECOSOC. This became apparent in the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1958, and although it was put off in the succeeding session late in 1959, there will be increasing pressure for what amounts to constitutional revision in this regard.

While there is justice and merit in the demand for more representative balance in such organs as the Security Council and ECOSOC, the consequences of revision could be damaging, at least insofar as revision would further contribute to the division between power on the one hand and responsibility on the other. The Western Powers, already sensitive of their lost ascendancy in the General Assembly, and increasingly dependent on Latin American votes for the success of their proposals and counter-proposals, can have no complacence if the fulcrum of voting power centers in the Soviet bloc and its nine or more members. But this could very well happen with the further and inevitable increase of Afro-Asian membership in the United Nations.

It may not be of any great importance, but a change in the membership of the Security Council, in terms of numbers, would probably end the phenomenon of the Soviet veto, if only by increasing the difficulty of marshaling a sufficient number of votes to require such a veto in order to defeat a proposal.

It might be said that the future of the United Nations may well be critically affected by the handling of two procedural problems: the issue of a more balanced representation in United Nations organs, and that of the limits of the domestic jurisdiction barrier against United Nations action. The perils implicit in the former problem have been touched upon. It is the latter, however, that has done the most damage in draining the confidence of many of the Western Powers in the usefulness of the United Nations. Human rights, including such propositions as racial equality, self-determination and "fundamental freedoms," have emerged as the paramount *raison d'être* of the United Nations, if mainly through the inadvertent convergence of separate pre-

occupations of the Western Powers on the one hand and of the Afro-Asian Powers on the other. The former are concerned with human rights in the Communist world, and the latter are concerned with human rights in the colonial world.

There are few questions more important than human rights, but there are also few questions more difficult to manage or more charged with moral fervor. Moreover, all these issues represent a fundamental challenge to the concept of domestic jurisdiction and to traditional ideas of the elements of sovereignty. If Indian diplomacy has begun to realize the impossibility of remaining insensitive to human rights questions in the Communist world, Britain has also begun to realize the difficulty of abstaining in the many South African questions before the United Nations. Nonetheless, "nonintervention in the domestic affairs" of member states remains a formidable proposition not easily reconciled with the United Nations' rapidly growing interest in and responsibilities for the advancement and protection of human rights. It would be ironic, but not too surprising, if the efforts of Africa-Asia to dissolve the domestic jurisdiction barrier in human rights questions were partly to boomerang. Of the many challenges facing the emergent states of Asia and Africa, that of the protection of human rights will not be among the easiest for them to meet.

Economic Aid

Having cast about, however briefly, among the problems of peace enforcement, pacific settlement, representation, domestic jurisdiction and human rights, it seems proper to reserve for the last main consideration the transcending importance of welfare responsibilities as the key to the future of the United Nations. A great deal more thought ought to be put into this category, particularly in the United States. The main stakes of the underdeveloped world in the United Nations and its main link with responsibility are in the area of economic cooperation. It is still far too academic a concern among the peoples of the Western world that the gap between the rich nations and the poor nations is not only very great but is constantly widening. This gap will represent a fundamental polarity in world affairs, much to the advantage

of the Communist world, as long as cooperative patterns of development remain on the periphery of United Nations business. A good, if meager, beginning was made two years ago by the establishment of the Special Fund, but much more must be done.

This is not to minimize the importance of either bilateral or regional programs of economic development, but rather to stress the importance to the whole concept of a United Nations of its being institutionally meaningful to the underdeveloped countries of the world. Otherwise, the temptation to use the United Nations mainly to highlight quarrels and conflicts, to proclaim empty words and to perpetuate illusions could defeat all of the ends for which the United Nations was constructed.

At the beginning of this review, emphasis was placed on the shortcomings and dilemmas of the United Nations; it is not, and is not likely to become, an effective agency of coercion; it does not, and cannot, contribute very much to the settlement of disputes; it cannot, nor should it, refrain from taking stands on moral questions, although in doing so it may handicap its own usefulness in solving moral questions. Later in the review, emphasis was placed on the contemporary challenges before the organization; that of a more balanced representation in its several organs, and that of the domestic jurisdiction clause and its relation to human rights questions—neither of which can be answered without considerable peril to the United Nations, but both of which will require viable answers in the near future. Finally, emphasis was placed on the one area of United

Nations responsibility and opportunity which is offered as the most critical to the whole concept and future of the organization: that of economic and technical cooperation.

The fuller implications of this review would include the observation that the traditional "first items" of international organization—those of security and disarmament—are frail reeds upon which to rest the future of the United Nations. International organization cannot yet manage these questions, and one should not rest his faith in the institution on its ability to do so.

It is clear that the United Nations is a vastly different organization from what it was a short decade ago. It has also greater potential for both good and bad than it did then. The future of the organization perhaps rests in its ability to meet maturely and effectively the challenge represented in it by the vast new world of independent, underdeveloped states of Asia and Africa.

Ross N. Berkes spent the fall of 1958 in Washington on a special assignment for the United States Department of State. Mr. Berkes has taught at the United States Naval Intelligence School in Washington, D. C. In 1945, he served on the staff of the Allied Secretariat, Four Power Control Council for Germany. On sabbatical leave, 1955-1956, he did research on British foreign policy at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

"The seeds of war lie dormant in every dispute between nations, awaiting the moisture of national pride and the heat of international disagreement to commence their germination. The settlement of those disputes, short of war, traditionally has been the function of diplomacy. . . .

". . . It is not surprising that in seeking an effective substitute for peace, the people of the world are turning as never before to the processes of the law as their last, desperate hope. They have seen the development of law administered by courts in their nations become an effective substitute for violence. They know that the removal of a subject of disagreement from the street corners and newspaper headlines to the relative calm and the ordered processes of the court-room inevitably results in a cooling off period, which in itself contributes tremendously to a peaceful solution. They likewise realize that the adjudication of controversies by an independent court in the light of established principles of law and morality is a fair means of solving them, whatever the ultimate decision. . . ."

—Ross L. Malone, President, American Bar Association, an address Jan. 30, 1959.

Discussing United Nations action in the Suez crisis, this British specialist raises the question whether the Suez action "should be regarded primarily as an epoch-making triumph for the United Nations or as the outcome of an alignment of Great Powers which would have had more or less the same consequences even if there had been no United Nations at all." He notes that "American economic pressure was sufficient to resolve the Suez crisis in accordance with the United Nations Charter," indicating a basic weakness in the United Nations. Still, he concludes that the creation of UNEF was "a landmark in the history of international organization."

The United Nations Emergency Force: A Notable Precedent

By G. F. HUDSON

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THE ACTION of the United Nations in the Suez crisis of 1956 was of two kinds; first the resolutions of the Assembly condemning the invasions of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France, and second the creation of a United Nations force "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities." The condemnatory resolutions, although by their massive majorities they were impressive manifestations of world opinion, were nothing new on such occasions; the General Assembly of the League of Nations had shown majorities no less impressive in condemning Japan in 1933 and Italy in 1935, and the United Nations had named North Korea and Communist China as aggressors during the Korean war. What was new in the Suez crisis was the move to create an *ad hoc* international police force from which all the Great Powers would be excluded.

This was the first time that an international security organization had tried such a method of restoring peace after an outbreak of hostilities. The League of Nations had undertaken economic sanctions against Italy in 1935, but they were not applied strongly enough to make Mussolini abandon his conquest of Abyssinia and ended in ignominious failure. The United Nations had authorized an international military intervention led by three Great Powers in Korea in 1950, and after a prolonged and costly war this was

successful in preserving the independence of South Korea, though it failed to bring about the reunification of the two Korean states. The enforcement measures of 1956, on the other hand, were effective in bringing about a withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt without fighting and without conceding any advantage from the invasion to Britain or France, and only a limited and fully justified advantage to Israel.

The question that arises in considering this episode in retrospect after three and a half years is whether it should be regarded primarily as an epoch-making triumph for the United Nations or as the outcome of an alignment of Great Powers which would have had more or less the same consequences even if there had been no United Nations at all.

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University, from 1926 to 1954, G. F. Hudson was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow (1932). He served several years with the British Foreign Office. An editor of *The Economist*, he is also author of *Europe and China: Their Relations in History to 1800* and *The Far East in World Politics*.

Unlike the Korean war, which ranged the Great Powers in their ideological cold war grouping, i.e., the United States, Britain and France against the Soviet Union and Communist China, the Suez crisis cut across this line of division and set the United States with the Communist powers on the one side against Britain and France on the other. This new grouping, however, only emerged during the year 1956 from an earlier array on the subject of Israel and the Arabs, in which all the Great Powers were nearer to unanimity than they had been on any other major international issue since the Second World War. This approach to a common front unfortunately had had nothing to do with common desires for constructive co-operation or the promotion of right and justice; it arose from competitive bidding between the two power blocs for the support of the Arab world.

In order to gain the favour of the new Arab nationalism, now emerging as an important factor in world affairs, the rival Great Powers had to make bids to help the Arabs obtain what they wanted most, and what they wanted most—at any rate emotionally—was the destruction of Israel. All the Great Powers that valued the friendship of the Arab countries—and it was clearly more valuable to them than the friendship of Israel—had therefore at least to pretend to be backing the Arab cause against Israel. Until Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain was competing just as vigorously as the United States and the Soviet Union in the anti-Israeli market. Indeed, nothing produced so much consternation in Israel in the period preceding the nationalization of the Canal as the suggestion made by the British Prime Minister, in his Mansion House speech, for a revision of Israel's frontiers in favour of the Arabs. Since the territory held by Israel was already a bare minimum for economic and strategic viability, Anthony Eden's proposals were naturally seen in Tel Aviv as a threat to the very existence of the Israeli state.

Egypt's War With Israel

The policy of the Egyptian government, in its role as leader of the Arab world, was to undermine and weaken Israel by means of blockade and irregular guerrilla warfare,

without full-scale military attack such as would involve the risks both of defeat in the field and of alienation of world opinion. By way of blockade, the Egyptian policy was to keep closed to Israeli trade both the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. This meant that Israel would be denied access to the Red Sea and could have no contact with the countries of the Indian Ocean and the Far East except by the long sea route through the Mediterranean and around Africa.

The Egyptian plea in justification of closing the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping or cargoes contrary to the treaty obligation to allow passage to all nations was that Egypt was at war with Israel and that the armistice did not abrogate the state of war until a peace treaty had been signed. The same argument was used to justify closure of the Tiran Straits—where Egyptian batteries were mounted on the desert coast to command the narrows—in order to set aside the accepted principle of international law which guarantees "innocent passage" through territorial waters of straits in time of peace. This Egyptian claim to be at war with Israel and to be entitled to belligerent rights was a dangerous one for Egypt, for the blockades were indeed acts of war, even though carried out within Egyptian territory; and they invited other acts of war on the part of Israel to counteract them.

Further, the right of Egypt to close the Suez Canal against Israel was denied by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, which no doubt reflected a general international concern at any action by Egypt tending to invalidate the treaty guaranteeing passage for all nations. Nasser, however, defied the Security Council and no attempt was made to compel him to conform to it.

The guerrilla warfare carried on by Nasser's Egypt against Israel by the so-called "fedayeen" was not defended in Cairo on the grounds of Egyptian belligerent rights. It was not admitted that Egypt had anything to do with these murderous raids, which were represented as spontaneous activities of displaced Palestinian Arabs. It was, however, an open secret that the guerrilla bands were trained, armed and financed by the Egyptian War Ministry, and operated from permanent camps on Egyptian territory. The raids

caused serious damage and casualties to Israel and the whole population in the southern part of the country had to be continually on the alert; the fedayeen crossed and recrossed the border by night and it was impossible to pursue them to their lairs without engaging in combat with the Egyptian regular forces that protected them.

The Growing Arab World

During 1955, Israel was unable to obtain redress from any quarter either against the Suez Canal and Tiran Straits blockades or against the fedayeen raids. None of the Great Powers was willing to offend Egypt and the other Arab states—the number of which multiplied as additional countries formerly under some form of European supremacy achieved full independence and membership in the United Nations. The Arab world extended from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic; its nations held control not only of the Suez Canal, but also of the world's largest resources of oil. The Arabs remained divided by rival local interests adverse to any real political unification, but there were two themes which made an appeal to all Arabs—opposition to imperialism, which in Arab experience meant Britain and France, and opposition to Israel.

From the time of Nasser's seizure of power in Egypt, an influence of unprecedented strength was exerted over the entire Arab world by exploitation of the new technique of radio propaganda. In the most remote mountains and deserts where the traditional ways of Muslim life had hitherto been almost untouched by modernity those who speak the Arabic language now listened to broadcasts from Cairo. The tide of pan-Arab feeling rose rapidly and it confronted its targets, Israel, Britain and France, with the need for formulating policies to meet the new situation.

For Israel there was little room for choice. Having once created their national state, the Israelis had either to defend it or be eliminated and the only question for them was whether to maintain a purely passive defense or whether to strike out against Egypt to destroy the bases of the fedayeen and free the Straits of Tiran from hostile artillery fire.

For Britain and France, however, there was more scope for political maneuver.

Britain had successfully come to terms with nationalism in India, Burma and Ceylon, transferring power by agreement to new national authorities and reaching friendly understandings for the preservation of purely economic interests. It was hoped in London gradually to wind up existing protectorates and special rights in the Arab countries by a similar procedure. There were, however, two factors which made the devolution of empire more difficult in the Middle East than in the further parts of Asia. The first was the belief in London, at least in the Conservative party, that the Suez Canal was a vital British interest which must never be allowed to fall under the control of a hostile power which could interfere with oil supplies from Arabia. The second was the existence of Israel, for which the Arabs held Britain responsible, even though most British politicians had long since regretted the Balfour Declaration and would have been glad to see the Israelis at the bottom of the sea if they could have been put there without a serious war.

A New British Policy

In the hope of establishing relations of permanent friendship with the new Egypt, Eden agreed to remove the British garrisons from the Suez Canal Zone in spite of bitter criticism and warnings from the extreme wing of the Conservative party which came to be known as the "Suez Group." With regard to Israel he hedged. He ignored the fedayeen raids and encouraged the Arabs to hope for frontier revision with British backing. At the same time, he tried to maintain in concert with the United States a policy of restricting supplies of arms to the Middle East so as to withhold from Egypt the offensive strength required for an all-out attack on Israel.

It was this latter feature of British policy that gave the Soviet Union its opportunity. Moscow suddenly began—through Czechoslovakia—to make substantial deliveries of modern armaments to Egypt. Thus Russia increased Arab power while at the same time assuming the role of champion of the Arab world against an Israel which was represented by Soviet propaganda as an instrument of British imperialism. It was this development which upset all the calculations

of the British government and left Eden without an answer to the reproaches levelled at him by the Suez group for his abandonment of the Canal Zone.

France now began to come more and more into the picture because of the war in Algeria. The French, like the British, had initially sought to conciliate Arab nationalism; they had given up, though not without a struggle, their protectorates over Morocco and Tunisia. But they refused to let Algeria go and became committed to the suppression of a major revolt which was given moral and material support from the rest of the Arab world, and particularly from Egypt. In Paris, Nasser came to be regarded as the principal enemy and his acceptance of Soviet military aid only made him the more dangerous.

American Policies

The American attitude was widely different from both the British and the French. Having no past or present colonial stakes in the Arab world and being independent of oil supplies from the Middle East, the United States government regarded with equanimity the ebullience of Pan-Arabism. Its main concern was to commend the United States to the Arabs as their unfailing friend and champion so as to outbid the Soviet Union in that role. After the beginning of the Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt it became all the more necessary in pursuit of this policy to avoid giving any offense to Nasser.

Dulles, however, was not altogether consistent in his policy. In spite of his pro-Egyptian bias he tried to put pressure on Nasser in connection with the negotiations for financing the Aswan High Dam. When this led Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, Dulles cooperated for a while with Eden in an attempt to institute by diplomacy some kind of international control for the Canal. But when it became clear that nothing short of force would induce Egypt to accept any such proposals, he drew back, while Britain and France continued on a course which had the armed coercion of Egypt as its only logical outcome.

There is still controversy with regard to the extent of "collusion" between Britain and France on the one hand and Israel on the other in the invasion of Egypt in Oc-

tober, 1956. It is unnecessary here to consider this question as a matter of responsibility. The main point is that the tension between the two European Great Powers and Egypt was in itself sufficient to encourage Israel to take the action against Egypt which she had not dared to take so long as all the Great Powers were engaged in courting Nasser.

For Britain and France, on the other hand, the Israeli attack on Egypt provided a pretext for intervention; they would themselves go into Egypt, neither to coerce Nasser nor to redress Israeli grievances—to which they were indeed quite indifferent—but to stop an Israeli-Egyptian war. This justification was nevertheless quite unconvincing, for by landing in the Canal Zone the British and French did not separate the contending Israeli and Egyptian forces, but in effect attacked the Egyptians in the rear. Moreover, however much they desired to dissociate themselves from the Israeli action, the fact that all three nations were invading Egypt at the same time necessarily linked them together in the eyes, not only of the Arabs, but of the whole world.

Israel's Justification

The case for Israel in this war was, however, quite distinct from that for Britain and France, and was morally and legally far stronger. Egypt officially claimed to be at war with Israel and had been committing a series of acts of war against her. On the other hand, the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company had not been an act of war or even of specific treaty violation, and Britain and France had no right under the Charter of the United Nations to resort to force in order to impose on Egypt international control of the Canal.

In retrospect it is clear that the best policy for Britain and France would have been to refrain from military action, but to act as advocates for Israel in the United Nations and see to it that Egypt did not get out of her disaster without a settlement which would provide for international control of the Canal. Nasser would then have been left with the ignominy of defeat by Israel instead of the glorious martyrdom of being the victim of attack by two Great Powers. As it was, Britain and France were incapable

of exerting any influence in the proceedings of the United Nations 'because they found themselves alongside Israel in the dock.'

Russian-American Cooperation

Britain and France had to abandon their Egyptian expedition and withdraw their forces without gaining any political advantage because of the convergent opposition of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Eden had not expected American support for his venture, but he fatally underestimated the vigor of the American protest at an operation undertaken in complete disregard of American policy. Soviet hostility had been expected but Eden did not believe that the Soviet Union would go to war for Egypt. In this estimate he proved to be right, for the Russians flew all their bombers out of Egypt to avoid involvement in the fighting, and the dark talk about rockets in Bulganin's letter was never translated into anything like an ultimatum.

Economic Pressure from the U.S.

Moscow was aware that, whatever might be the American attitude to the invasions of Egypt, the United States would certainly act to counter unilateral military action by the Soviet Union against Britain or France. Soviet threats were not in fact sufficient to compel Britain and France to desist from their action in Egypt. But the American threat of withdrawal of financial support for the British currency was decisive, for there was no doubt that it could and would be carried out, and with deep divisions within the British nation over the Suez policy, this was a form of pressure that the British government was not prepared to meet. Eden therefore was allowed to have a nervous breakdown and retire to Jamaica.

The overwhelming adverse votes in the United Nations Assembly undoubtedly also had their effect in inducing Britain and France to abandon their enterprise. It was a new and most unpleasant experience for them to find themselves arraigned and condemned by world opinion as aggressors and there was an instinctive urge to escape from such a situation. It is nevertheless improbable that the British and French governments would have capitulated as they did if serious economic pressure had not been

added by the action of the United States to the moral condemnation pronounced by the Assembly. Both governments had sufficient parliamentary majorities and fairly strong popular support to sustain them; there was no military problem in Egypt, for the Egyptian army was incapable of effective resistance.

U.N. Weakness

The outcome indeed again showed that decisions of the United Nations in relation to Great Powers depend for their enforcement on actions of other Great Powers which are taken in accordance with their general foreign policies and not automatically or under orders from the United Nations as a collective body. American economic pressure was sufficient to resolve the Suez crisis in accordance with the United Nations Charter because Britain and France were extremely vulnerable to such pressure. On the other hand, in the case of Hungary, the Soviet Union totally disregarded United Nations decisions and could not be compelled to conform to them, because it was not vulnerable to economic pressure and military action would merely have meant a world war.

U.N. Strength

In organizing and sending to Egypt a special international force to supervise the withdrawals the United Nations did carry out a notable action of its own which not only set a precedent for the future, but was certainly effective in preventing a renewal of violence on the Egyptian-Israeli border. The idea of an international force was originally devised by Lester Pearson of Canada as a means by which the British and French forces in Egypt might be brought within a framework of United Nations authority. Britain and France officially welcomed the idea and appear at the outset to have believed that it would not be possible for the United Nations to assemble such a force at short notice, so that British and French forces could be kept in Egypt for a lengthy period pending its arrival.

Once the Assembly had approved the principle, however, the formation of UNEF proceeded rapidly, and assumed a character quite different from Pearson's original con-

cept. Not only did it exclude British or French participation, it excluded all the Great Powers. If any Great Power were to take part, the Soviet Union could not be left out, and as it was the American aim to keep Soviet troops out of the Middle East, the United States sponsored the principle of limiting UNEF to small, neutral nations. Further, as its entry into Egypt was to be made conditional on Egypt's consent, it became a means, not of imposing terms on Egypt as part of a political settlement, but of obtaining the unconditional evacuation of the invading armies.

Britain and France thus got nothing out of the creation of UNEF except perhaps a certain saving of face; Israel, on the other hand, did gain an advantage insofar as it prevented a renewal of violence on the border after the Israeli withdrawal. UNEF had really no function to perform with re-

gard to the British and French evacuations; when the European invaders re-embarked, they left Egypt altogether and all contact with Egyptian forces was broken off. But the Israelis could only go back to a land frontier followed by the "victorious" Egyptians, and if there had been no UNEF, there would in all probability have been a resurgence of fedayeen raids and blockade of the Tiran Straits.

The presence of UNEF was sufficient—even without specific instructions from the United Nations Assembly—to inhibit further acts of war by the Egyptians on the frontier or in the Gulf of Aqaba. This was a notable achievement, and one which was by itself enough to make the Assembly resolution of November 4 calling on the Secretary General to set up an "emergency international United Nations force" a landmark in the history of international organization.

Debating Free World Security

CURRENT HISTORY has devoted three special issues to the topic chosen for the National University Extension Association debate for 1960-1961: How can the security of the free world best be maintained? The discussion will center on three aspects: Nato, the United Nations, and the role of a federal world government. In accord with the discussion topics, CURRENT HISTORY is pleased to announce that the following material is being made available:

THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREE WORLD SECURITY June, 1960

In this issue seven specialists evaluate the role of the United Nations in meeting the challenges of the last 15 years. Articles include:

SUMMING UP THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFECTIVENESS * THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUNGARY * THE UNITED NATIONS' PRESENCE IN LAOS * THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS * THE UNITED NATIONS AND KOREA * THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD'S REFUGEES * IMPACT OF THE NEW AFRICAN STATES ON THE U.N.

WORLD GOVERNMENT AND FEDERATION August, 1960

This issue on world government explores various historical experiences with federalism. Articles include: **THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS * THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN FEDERATION * REGIONAL GROUPINGS: PROGRESS TOWARD WORLD FEDERALISM? * THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE * THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS * THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND THE FRENCH COMMUNITY * ATTEMPTS AT WORLD GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO 1918 * A BLUEPRINT FOR AN ADEQUATE WORLD FEDERATION**

NATO AND FREE WORLD SECURITY September, 1960

Analyzing the role of Nato in guaranteeing free world security, seven authors review Nato's accomplishments as follows:

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO * THE RUSSIAN VIEW OF NATO * THE UNITED STATES VIEW OF NATO * NATO AND ITS WEST EUROPEAN PARTNERS * THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATO * THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF NATO * THE WEAKNESSES OF NATO

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Evaluating the results of the United Nations collective action in Korea, this specialist writes that the U.N. ". . . played an important role in keeping the Korean military action limited and in fact gave valuable help to the United States government in its desire to avoid fighting a major war in the Far East at a time when strong domestic pressures were willing to take that risk."

Collective Action in Korea

By LELAND M. GOODRICH

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THE KOREAN question has been one of the toughest and most persistent of the problems which the United Nations has been called upon to solve. It is the only one of the divided-state problems that the Organization has been asked to tackle in its entirety. While certain limited aspects of the German question have come before the United Nations, the major powers have generally insisted on handling this question outside the U.N. The same has been true of Vietnam. The Korean question also has the distinction of having been the sole occasion for enforcement action under the Charter. A product of the "cold war," it has been a cause of frustration and disappointment. Though it has concerned U.N. organs since 1947, it appears to be no nearer satisfactory solution in 1960 than it was when it first appeared on the General Assembly agenda. And yet, it would be wrong to conclude that the United Nations has not made positive and valuable contributions to the handling of the question.

The Korean question is basically how to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea. This was the objective to

which the major allied powers committed themselves in the last war. Since 1905, for all practical purposes, Korea had been under Japanese control. The establishment of a protectorate in 1905 was followed by outright annexation in 1910. At Cairo, in 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek announced their determination that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." This affirmation was subsequently repeated at Potsdam in July, 1945, and was adhered to by Stalin when the Soviet Union entered the war on August 8. Under an arrangement drafted in Washington and subsequently accepted by Stalin, Korea was divided at the thirty-eighth parallel into American and Soviet zones for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces, and these zones became areas of American and Soviet military occupation.

Efforts of the American and Soviet military commands to achieve the economic and administrative unification of the two areas were unsuccessful. A four-power agreement at Moscow in December, 1945, provided for the establishment of a "provisional Korean democratic government" with a view to "the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state." This was followed by futile negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union at both the military and diplomatic levels. Finally, frustrated by Soviet obstructions and anxious to terminate military occupation of South Korea for military and other reasons, the United States government requested the General Assembly in September, 1947, to

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consider "The Problem of the Independence of Korea."

Though aware of the fact that the General Assembly could only recommend and certainly under no illusions that Soviet consent to United States proposals would be any easier to obtain in the United Nations than outside, the United States government apparently saw an advantage in placing on the United Nations some of the responsibility which it had hitherto borne largely alone for achieving a united independent Korea. Furthermore, those responsible for this initiative may have believed that through the United Nations enough pressure could be mobilized to convince the Soviet Union in time that it was not worthwhile to continue to maintain its intransigent position. However, the diametrically opposed purposes and strategic interests of the two powers in Korea, under the gathering clouds of the cold war, caused many observers to feel that the U.N. was being called upon to assume a responsibility beyond its means.

Following the submission of proposals by the United States delegation, somewhat amended in the course of discussion, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on November 14, 1947, which was the basis of United Nations action in the years that followed. By this resolution the Assembly created a Temporary Commission on Korea to observe elections throughout Korea and to assist in the establishment of a national government through consultation with the elected Korean representative. The resolution envisaged the withdrawal of occupation forces and the organization of national security forces which would permit Korea to function as a fully independent state. The Soviet delegation stated that its government would not accept this program nor cooperate in carrying it out.

South Korean Government Established

Upon its arrival in Korea, the Temporary Commission found that, due to the refusal of the Soviet military authorities to cooperate, it would be unable to perform its assigned task in both North and South Korea. On consulting the Interim committee, it was advised that it should carry out its mission in South Korea alone if denied access to North Korea. This it did. Elections were

held on May 10, 1948, under what the Commission found to be reasonably peaceful and free conditions, and the elected Korean representatives organized a government, with Dr. Syngman Rhee as President, which the United States recognized on August 12. On December 12, the General Assembly adopted a United States-inspired resolution which recognized this government as "a lawful government," based on free elections, and the only such government in Korea, and established The United Nations Commission on Korea to carry on the work of the Temporary Commission.

Meanwhile, a Communist-controlled government, that of the People's Republic of Korea, was installed in the north and Soviet forces of occupation were withdrawn. By the end of June, 1949, United States military forces were withdrawn from the Republic of Korea though a military mission remained to assist in carrying out the substantial program of American military aid.

Up to this point, the net effect of the United Nations action was to assist in the creation of a Korean government in the south based on reasonably free elections, under conditions which seemed to push into the very remote future any possibility of unification of the whole country. The United Nations had thus taken a stand in defense of the principles of the free world and had assisted in getting them applied within that part of Korea controlled by the United States, but it had not been successful in getting these principles applied in the Communist-controlled area. It had not been successful in bringing the two sides in the Korean "cold war" any nearer to a peaceful settlement. It was probably beyond its means to do so. It may in fact have helped to create some false illusions regarding the security of the Republic but here the major responsibility certainly rested not on the United Nations, but on the United States.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean armed forces invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea without warning, obviously for the purpose of achieving Korean unification on Communist terms. This came as a surprise to the United States and to most members of the United Nations. While the United Nations Commission on Korea had warned of the perils of a divided Korea and the As-

sembly had in fact authorized the Commission to observe and report any developments which might lead to armed conflict, there was considerable optimism in the West, particularly in the United States, that American military and economic aid to the Republic of Korea had succeeded in creating sufficient strength to deter an attack from the north. The initial success of the North Korean forces clearly showed that American intelligence had been deficient.

The North Korean attack was obviously more than a domestic Korean affair, even though the immediately contending parties were two claimants for recognition as the government of a united Korea. Since the Republic of Korea in the south and the political forces backing it had been consistently supported by the United States, and the People's Republic in the north and the party organization had full Soviet support, the attack appeared to represent an open military challenge by the Soviet Union to the United States, the first instance in the "cold war" of open resort to violence by one side against the other. Furthermore, since the Republic had been in a sense the creation of the United Nations, the North Korean attack was an open challenge to the authority of the United Nations. If the attack was not contained and thrown back and the fighting kept within limits, there was indeed danger that this would lead to a major armed struggle with both sides involved with their full complement of forces and armaments.

Clearly the major responsibility for meeting the challenge rested on the United States, since it alone had been responsible for involving the United Nations in the situation and it alone was in the position to take the military and other measures necessary to defend the Republic of Korea. The Truman Administration accepted this responsibility and chose to act through the United Nations, thus demonstrating that it recognized an interest larger than a purely American one in stopping the aggression and showing its intention to make collective security effective. An incidental and important result from the United States' point of view would be to convince its Western European allies that they could rely on United States' assistance in case of a Soviet attack in the West.

Collective action through the United Nations became possible and was facilitated by a fortuitous combination of circumstances. The absence of the Soviet representative from the Security Council made it possible for Council decisions to be taken, the absence of a permanent member not being treated as a veto. The presence of United States armed forces in Japan and in the Western Pacific and the interest of the United States in the security of Japan made possible and assured prompt action by the United States to thwart the Communist purpose. And the presence of the United Nations Commission in Korea, with observers on the thirty-eighth parallel, made it possible for information from a United Nations source to be quickly communicated to the Security Council, thus convincing even the uncommitted states in the "cold war" that a military attack had occurred and assuring greater unity and quickness of response than might have been possible if the only information received had been Korean or even American.

U.N. Action

The Security Council, meeting at the request of the United States, acted promptly. On June 25 it found that a breach of the peace existed, called on the North Korean authorities to withdraw their forces and called upon members of the United Nations to assist in carrying out this resolution. On June 27 it recommended—not having the forces at its disposal to order—that members furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as was necessary "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the time interpreted this as meaning the restoration of the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion. On July 7, the Council recommended that the members providing armed forces and assistance make such forces available to "a unified command under the United States" and requested the United States to designate the commander. General MacArthur, commander of United States forces in Japan and of those then engaged in Korea, was designated United Nations Commander by President Truman. In the course of subsequent military operations

in Korea 15 members of the United Nations other than the United States contributed armed forces. The United States and the Korean forces combined constituted over 90 per cent of the total United Nations forces. Many members made other than military contributions,—food, raw materials, medical supplies, and so on.

The United Nations force was largely an American force under American strategic direction and command. The other members of the United Nations were prepared initially at least to follow United States leadership without serious question. This was particularly true during the early phase when the North Korean forces were on the offensive and the ability of the United Nations forces to stop them was in doubt. Also, after the Inchon landing on September 15, when the fortunes of war were suddenly reversed and the prospect seemed good that the Communists could be driven from North Korea, the other members were generally prepared to accept the United States' view that the objective of collective measures might be extended to include the unification of Korea under the terms of the Assembly's 1947 resolution.

Thus the General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, by clear inference authorized the United Nations forces to proceed north of the thirty-eighth parallel and establish "conditions of stability throughout Korea," which would permit the holding of free elections and the establishment of a free, independent and democratic Korea. Even though this resolution appeared to define the objective of collective measures in considerably more ambitious terms than the Security Council resolution of June 27, there was very little opposition outside the Communist bloc to its adoption.

It soon became clear, however, that this new objective was not to be easily realized, as Chinese Communist threats of intervention were soon followed by reports of the actual presence of Chinese Communists with the North Korean forces. General MacArthur reported to the Security Council on November 6 that intervention was a fact. The presence of the Soviet Union in the Council (its representative had returned on August 1) prevented any decision from being taken by that organ.

The United States then requested that the General Assembly consider the matter. In the General Assembly it was soon apparent that many members were reluctant to proceed promptly with additional measures, directed particularly against Communist China, for fear that a general war could ensue. Instead the Assembly first directed its efforts to achieve the termination of hostilities by agreement and a peaceful settlement. It was not until February 1 that the Assembly was prepared to adopt a resolution finding that the Chinese Communists had engaged in aggression and even then the Assembly was not prepared to recommend additional measures immediately. This was not done until May 18 when the application by members of certain economic measures was recommended. In the meantime United Nations forces had suffered a severe and near-disastrous military reversal at the hands of the Communists and only with considerable difficulty were they again able to stabilize the military line in the general vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel. This experience, the obvious unwillingness of other members of the United Nations to run the risk of a major war, and the conviction of the Truman administration that this was the wrong place to become involved in a major war induced the United States government to revert to the earlier objective of military action in Korea, namely, to drive the North Koreans back of the thirty-eighth parallel and restore the Republic of Korea within previously existing territorial limits with guarantees that aggression would not be repeated.

The Armistice Agreement, signed after two years of frustrating negotiations on July 27, 1953, established a demarcation line somewhat more favorable to the Republic of Korea than the thirty-eighth parallel and provided for a demilitarized zone along this line. It stipulated that there should be no reinforcing of personnel or combat equipment and set up neutral commissions to supervise and guarantee the carrying out of the armistice terms. The prisoner-of-war issue was settled on terms acceptable to the United Nations. Provision was made for a political conference to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Re-

public of Korea received the promise that if it were again attacked it would receive the assistance of the United Nations and the members that had supported it in this instance.

Korea's Problems Unsolved

Thus, following three years of fighting, the last two being of a very limited nature, the Korean political problem was left about where it had been initially. Korea was divided. The Communists—now supported by the Chinese rather than the Russians—were in control of the north, and Syngman Rhee and his party, elected by the Korean people and supported by the United Nations and the United States, were in control of the south. The security position of the Republic of Korea had been improved, but on the other hand the Republic of Korea had experienced heavy human and economic losses as the result of the war. Korea was no nearer unification and the basic conflict between Communists and non-Communists which was the cause of division was no nearer settlement.

The political conference for which provision was made in the Armistice Agreement met in Geneva in 1954 but failed to produce any agreement. Fifteen of the sixteen United Nations members contributing forces in Korea (the Union of South Africa did not participate in the Conference) took the occasion to reassert the right of the United Nations to take collective measures in Korea and the principle upon which the United Nations had sought to achieve a united, independent and democratic Korea. The United Nations General Assembly has since then repeatedly reaffirmed these principles. The military provisions of the Armistice Agreement have not remained intact. Following alleged repeated violations of the Agreement not to reinforce personnel or combat equipment, the United Nations Command in 1957 announced that it considered itself no-longer bound by this agreement. Earlier, in June, 1956, the Command had decided to suspend the activity of the United Nations Supervisory Commission.

How, then, should we evaluate the role of

the United Nations in dealing with the Korean question? Did the United Nations make any constructive contribution? Would matters have been much the same, or perhaps even better, if the United Nations had not been involved in any way? Obviously it is impossible to provide an answer which will be satisfactory to everybody when so much depends on values and assumptions. This is only one of many possible judgments. A strong case can be made for the following positive contributions made by the United Nations.

1) The United Nations played a constructive role in helping to bring the Republic of Korea into existence. In spite of its faults, few would deny that the Rhee government is based on the freely expressed will of the Korean people to a greater extent than the Communist regime in the north. The United Nations played an important role initially in making this possible.

2) While the United Nations was only the instrument chosen for giving effective assistance to the Republic of Korea when attacked it is significant that the United States chose to give its aid within a United Nations framework. This demonstration of effective collective measures may indeed have helped to deter aggressive action in other parts of the world, and certainly helped to create confidence in other countries exposed to threats of external aggression. Furthermore, the United Nations played an important role in keeping the Korean military action limited and in fact gave valuable help to the United States government in its desire to avoid fighting a major war in the Far East at a time when strong domestic pressures were willing to take that risk.

3) Though the United States assumed the major responsibility for Korean relief and rehabilitation, the United Nations contribution was substantial. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency was established in December, 1950. Though it was not able to function until the conclusion of hostilities, down to September, 1958, when it concluded its labors, it spent approximately \$148,500,000, contributed by 34 members of the United Nations.

"There are some 2,800 languages in the world."
—From a Twentieth Century Fund Study.

Developments in Laos, according to this observer, "provide a striking demonstration of what the United Nations can do to preserve the peace, to prevent national troubles from becoming serious international issues and to give wide counsel to a member state." As he sees it, "there are important lessons to be learned from these events."

A "Presence" in Laos

By EDWIN F. STANTON

U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, 1949-1953

THE United Nations "presence" in Laos and the action taken by the Secretary General and his representatives there point up the highly important role that this international organization and its officers can play in a world in turmoil. Has the United Nations "presence" in Laos been effective? I feel the answer is definitely in the affirmative.

As the whole world knows, the Kingdom of Laos was in trouble last year. What had gone wrong in "the land of the Million Elephants," or "Lan Chang?" The Kingdom, occupied by the French in 1885, is a fascinating country with a mellow, unhurried civilization stretching back to the thirteenth century.

Edwin F. Stanton has had a distinguished career in the United States Foreign Service. Prior to World War II, he served with United States legations in Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin, Tsinan, Hankow and Shanghai, China. After World War II, he was assigned to the Department of State as Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs. From 1946 to 1947, he was Minister to Thailand. In 1948, he was appointed Ambassador and the President's special representative to Burma. A trustee of the China Institute and the Asia Society, he also served as United States delegate to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 1948-1952. He is the author of *Brief Authority*.

Westerners viewing it are apt to describe the country as backward. If by backward it is meant that Laos lacks modern roads, railroads, medical and sanitary systems, refrigerators, television and other gadgets, the term is descriptive. I wonder, however, if the technological marvels of the West are adequate criteria of civilization? I cannot refrain from pointing out that well before Columbus discovered the American continent, the Kingdom of Laos had attained an impressive degree of civilization and culture and an orderly but leisurely existence which revolved around the village temple, center of religious and social life, and around the king.

There was and is respect for the king and established authority, pride in artistic creation, love of music and festivals and contentment with the essentials of life in keeping with Buddhist thinking which discourages the amassing of wealth and things material. Surely, reasonable contentment coupled with an unhurried pace has much to commend it. It is a way of life that does not burn itself out with the rapidity and competitive flame characteristic of the West.

Genesis of Trouble

Trouble in Laos is not new. I can remember, in 1953, when I was in Bangkok, the lightning-like invasion of the kingdom by Vietminh troops from Communist North Vietnam, who knifed the country in two and almost captured the royal city of Luang Prabang from which His Majesty King Sisavang Vong (who has since died) refused to budge in spite of the danger.

But the trouble goes back even further than that to the "Lao Issara," or Lao Independence Movement, formed during World War II, whose objective was to gain total freedom and independence for Laos from French rule. With the end of the war and the return of the French to Indochina, a split occurred in the ranks of the "Lao Issara." Some joined the new government set up by the French with the idea of working for independence by constitutional means. Others held aloof. Rallying around Prince Souphanouvong, they took to the jungles and the hinterland from where they carried on sporadic guerrilla activities against the French and the Royal Lao Government and sought to win the support of the peasantry and the hill tribes. They called themselves "Pathet Lao."

Their nominal leader, Prince Souphanouvong, for he is not and has not been the actual leader of the "Pathet Lao" for some time, is a half brother of Prince Souvanna Phouma, prominent for a number of years as Prime Minister of Laos. Prince Souphanouvong was living in Bangkok in 1946 when I arrived there. An intense ultra nationalist, his political views and ambitions were magnified by the dominant personality of a very beautiful wife, who is a Vietnamese, and who was even then greatly influenced by Ho Chi Minh, today President of Communist North Vietnam. These and other circumstances resulted in the Prince linking his fortunes to those of Ho Chi Minh with each, no doubt, hoping to use the other to further his political ambitions. This led to the training and equipping of the Prince's guerrillas, the "Pathet Lao," by Ho Chi Minh's officers, the indoctrination of these units by Communist political officers and general logistic and other support by the Vietminh. These developments date back to the period 1946-1953.

Although the Prince and his followers have suffered a setback as the result of the events of last year, there is no doubt that he and the political party formed by the "Pathet Lao" and known as the "Neo Lao Hak Sat" (National Patriotic Front), have a considerable following as indicated by the fact that they won one-third of the seats in the National Assembly in the elections of May, 1958. Indeed, it was this show of popular

strength and support as much as anything that led the Royal Lao Government to suspend the Assembly, thus leading to an open break between the government and the "Pathet Lao," the arrest of Prince Souphanouvong and subsequent clashes in the northeastern provinces of Samneua and Phongsaly between government forces and the "Pathet Lao" rebels, supported by Communist North Vietnam.

The United Nations "Presence" in Laos

These events (which are described in greater detail in an article entitled "Laos: Pawn in Power Politics" in the February, 1960, issue of *CURRENT HISTORY*) led to charges and counter charges between the two power blocs. The Communists charged that Laos had violated the Geneva accords of 1954 and was permitting the United States to turn the country into an "imperialist base." The United States retorted that the trouble was Communist inspired, while the Royal Lao government sent a representative to the United Nations to seek "advice." Early in September, following further clashes in the northeastern provinces, the Lao government appealed to the United Nations for "the prompt dispatch of an emergency force to halt aggression and prevent its spreading," declaring further that "in the face of this flagrant aggression for which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Communist North Vietnam) must bear the entire responsibility, Laos is requesting the assistance of the United Nations."

There ensued several weeks of intense diplomatic maneuvering in the United Nations. Against Soviet protests, the Security Council on September 8, 1959, appointed a "fact finding" subcommittee to proceed to Laos to determine the "facts." On November 6, 1959, the committee, having visited Laos, filed a report which described its major conclusions as follows: "the ensemble of information submitted to the subcommittee did not clearly establish whether there were crossings of the frontier by regular troops of the D.R.V.N." (Communist North Vietnam). However, the subcommittee reported some evidence of Communist support to the rebel forces in the shape of arms and supplies.

These inconclusive findings precluded any

further action by the Security Council. Nevertheless, it was realized that the dispatch of the subcommittee had a salutary effect and that the "Pathet Lao" guerrillas did not seem to be anxious to renew attacks on the government's forces with the United Nations subcommittee looking on from within Laos. No doubt, the presence of the subcommittee and its findings also had a sobering effect on the Royal Lao government and the military.

It was not unnatural that this improvement in the situation should arouse hopes that a United Nations "presence" in some form could be established within Laos on a continuing basis and that this would prevent any further hostilities and engender stability. The question was whether a United Nations "presence" could be established in the face of the objections of the Soviet delegate, who declared following the presentation of the subcommittee's report that the charges of the Royal Lao government had "collapsed like a card castle."

Much careful thought was given this delicate problem by the Secretary General, who was being quietly urged by some members of the United Nations to take steps to establish a United Nations "presence" as a means of maintaining peace in the area and reducing tensions. Hammarskjold held many private talks with various delegates, including the Soviet representative. It was then announced that the Secretary General planned to visit Laos in the near future in order "to gain full personal knowledge of conditions there." Hammarskjold assured the Communist members of the United Nations that his proposed visit had nothing to do with the report filed by the United Nations subcommittee and that the object of his trip, which was in the nature of a follow-up to the visit he made earlier in 1959, was to see what technical and economic assistance the country needed. The Soviet delegate objected, but not very vehemently.

The Secretary General left almost immediately for Laos and conferred with the authorities there for a week. There is no doubt that Hammarskjold not only discussed the economic and technical needs of the country but also the political situation and the best course for the government to pursue with a view to establishing a stable peace

and insuring the orderly development of the nation. I believe he is thoroughly realistic and pragmatic in feeling that while economic stability can only be achieved with substantial outside assistance, it is in the best interest of Laos that such assistance should come, primarily, from an international organization, such as the United Nations or the World Bank.

On November 14, 1959, the Secretary General summoned S. S. Tuomioja, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission in Europe and former Prime Minister of Finland, to join him. He left Tuomioja in Laos to study the country's economy and submit a report together with his recommendations. In December, Tuomioja submitted his report directly to Hammarskjold and not to the United Nations. This he could do because he was in Laos as the Secretary General's personal representative. This is an interesting and important technicality that makes it possible for the Secretary General to take action on his own initiative and responsibility without proceeding through the involved channels of the United Nations with their many hazards.

Tuomioja proposed "coordinated action" by the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned to assist the Kingdom of Laos in its economic and social development. The principal fields in which "coordinated action" was recommended were:

1. Development of the country's natural resources.
2. Initiation of an extensive program of rural development, particular attention being given to the needs and problems of the hill tribes.
3. Creation of an adequate transport and communications network, including improvement of communications with the outside world.
4. Improvement of public health and medical facilities.
5. Development of an educational system suited to the needs of the country.
6. Improvement of the country's administrative system.

The recommendations regarding rural development are especially important and timely because it is only through a continuing program designed to meet the basic needs of the rural population that the Royal

Lao government can win the firm loyalty and support of the people. This is particularly true of the hill tribes in the north and northeast where rebel "Pathet Lao" and Communist influences have been the strongest. Tuomioja further urged that certain short term projects commence immediately to produce a favorable local climate for the initiation of the long term program outlined above. Another interesting recommendation was that Asian personnel should be used to the greatest extent possible in the execution of the program.

An observation which we in this country should particularly note and ponder is this Finnish expert's impartial comment that the large scale foreign aid already given the Kingdom of Laos, which in the case of the United States has amounted to over \$200 million during the past five years, "has not so far achieved significant results or strengthened the productive capacity of the country." Following Tuomioja's departure, the Secretary General dispatched Zellweger, a noted Swiss jurist and diplomat, to begin the implementation of the recommended program and to act as the United Nations "presence" in Laos. Zellweger arrived in March, 1960, and immediately immersed himself in the economic and social problems confronting the country.

To bring the story up-to-date, it should be noted that in the latter part of December, 1959, the Royal Lao Army assumed control following the resignation of Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone, and then relinquished power a week later to a new government named by His Majesty King Sri Savang Vathana. This is actually a "caretaker government" to function pending national elections. At this moment of internal political crisis, the Secretary General telegraphed H.M. the King, reminding him of a conversation in which His Majesty gave reason to hope that "no changes will take place which could raise doubt with regard to the basic foundations of the policies of the country and the confidence they have created." Hammarskjold added that a "propitious beginning had been made to give effect to the United Nations' interest in the country" and that to date a "favorable result" seemed to have been achieved by the U.N. "presence" in Laos.

In New York, Thephathay Vilaihongs, the Royal Lao government's permanent representative to the United Nations, who incidentally has shown great good judgment and diplomatic skill in steering his country's complaint through the intricacies of the United Nations, declared he had been authorized by his foreign minister to state that the objectives of the new government would be active neutrality, democracy and national reconciliation. This position is known to be in general accord with the views of the Secretary General and his representatives in Laos who have made a careful on-the-spot review and assessment of the situation. It is understood to be their belief that Laos is in real need of assistance to put her economy on a more stable basis. Given the country's vulnerable geographic location and internal and external political pressures they believe that the wisest course for the country is one of neutrality between the great power blocs, concentrating its energies on achieving stability and improving the welfare of the people.

Effectiveness of the U.N. Presence

Laotians who have been directly concerned with the developments of the past eight months feel that the United Nations "presence" has been influential. First of all let it be noted that by careful and thoughtful parliamentary tactics, the plight of the Lao government was not made a matter of substantive debate in the Security Council where it would have surely invoked the Soviet veto. Instead, as a procedural matter, a fact-finding subcommittee of the Council was appointed and dispatched to Laos. Its findings soothed the sensibilities of the entire Communist bloc, including states both within and outside the United Nations. Indeed, it was highly significant that attacks by the Communist supported "Pathet Lao" guerrillas ceased almost immediately upon the arrival of the United Nations subcommittee, while the propaganda blasts from the Communist capitals began to dwindle away. The prestige and presence of the United Nations representatives seemed to work like some magic charm.

Secondly, it should be noted that a continuation of the United Nations "presence" was skillfully achieved by the Secretary Gen-

eral's visit to Laos "to gain full personal knowledge" and the dispatch of personal representatives who are concentrating on such useful objectives as rural development, public health, communications and education, to which the Communist bloc can hardly take exception.

Thirdly, it should be recorded that the results achieved by restrained and intelligent action on the part of key members of the United Nations and more particularly because of the initiative, careful planning and tact of the Secretary General, are indeed significant. These results may be summarized as follows:

The flare-up of trouble within Laos in 1959, although not new, had within it the seeds of more than opposition political groups resorting to arms to win their objectives. What loomed was the possibility of hostilities between the Royal Lao government, supported by the United States and some other members of Seato, on the one hand, and the "Pathet Lao" forces supported by Communist North Vietnam on the other. No one can say whether such "brush fire wars," as military experts rather euphemistically call them, might not mushroom into dreaded World War III.

Action taken within the United Nations and more especially by the Secretary General:

(1) Prevented the trouble from assuming serious international proportions between the two power blocs.

(2) Disposed of the issue presented by the Royal Lao government to the United Nations, thus relaxing tensions.

(3) Stopped the sporadic fighting in Laos, at least temporarily.

(4) Skillfully introduced the U.N. "presence" into that country on a long term basis.

(5) Gave and is giving to Laos the moral support of the United Nations, for which the Laotians are grateful, and is arranging for much needed technical and economic assistance which will build up, not the country's armed forces, but its more basic and essential needs.

These developments provide a striking demonstration of what the United Nations can do to preserve the peace, to prevent national troubles from becoming serious international issues and to give wise counsel to a member state. In addition, the U.N. can

assist in promoting the welfare of its people. There are important lessons to be learned from these events.

The United Nations, and particularly the Secretary General, can take useful and effective action, at least in situations of this sort which are constantly erupting in the world's present state of political turbulence and flux. This can be done in spite of "big power" opposition if careful thought is given to parliamentary tactics and if such tactics are skillfully and diplomatically exercised. Furthermore, it is evident that a Secretary General with initiative, ability and wisdom can, in his official and personal capacity, take rapid and effective measures without necessarily referring such measures either to the Security Council or the General Assembly.

It is also evident that the Secretary General, as in the case of Laos, can utilize the extensive resources and facilities of the various specialized agencies of the United Nations and can draw on a tremendous reservoir of highly competent and expert personnel of *all* nationalities to meet a given situation.

It is evident that the Secretary General and his representatives have given advice and counsel to the Royal Lao government in the utmost frankness, not only about economic matters, but even more importantly concerning the political situation confronting the country. Such counsel has been well received, but would have been resented if given by one of the big powers.

It is evident that the success of Mr. Hammarskjold's action, thus far, is due in large measure to the strictly neutral position that he and his representatives have taken. They have been successful in persuading the Lao authorities of the wisdom of not becoming too deeply involved with either power bloc, but rather concentrating on improving the economic well-being of their people. To this no one can take exception. This sound position not only reflects the Secretary General's strong belief in the fact that his usefulness and effectiveness are contingent on strict neutrality and impartiality as between nations, but is also indicative of his ability to assess clearly and realistically what is best for the country in trouble and what is most conducive to the preservation of the peace.

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Although "a substantial refugee problem" remains, this author feels that in considerable measure, the United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies have coped with those crises for which they felt a particular responsibility. . . ." Here is an analysis of refugee problems and the United Nations' handling of them.

The Problem of Refugees

By LOUISE W. HOLBORN

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FEW MODERN issues have so obviously outgrown the capacity of nation states or voluntary organizations to provide a solution as has the refugee problem. The desperate situation of millions of homeless men, women and children at the end of World Wars I and II; the stream of people fleeing from Nazi persecution or Communist intolerance; the many up-rooted and displaced persons resulting from conflicts such as those over Palestine and Korea and more recently in Algeria and Tibet; as well as the partitions of India and Indochina have caused incalculable human suffering and dispersed people over ever-widening areas. These forced and often sudden mass movements created explosive political as well as economic and social situations which endangered the peace and thus presented grave political problems as well as great humanitarian challenges.

Since countries of first asylum could rarely carry the burden of maintaining these refugees, let alone settling them, this issue became one of the first referred to an international organization after both World War I and World War II. In considerable measure,

the United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies have coped with those crises for which they felt a particular responsibility, though always handicapped by lack of resources and the political tensions which created the refugees in the first place. That there still remains a substantial refugee problem, whose dimensions are spotlighted by World Refugee Year, is the result of new crises and of political tensions, and of the failure of the United Nations to assume responsibility for certain refugee groups. This situation provides a challenge not only to the continued use of existing international facilities for refugees but also to extended efforts.

The work for refugees, like that in other fields, has inevitably been affected by the tensions of the Cold War. Of the estimated 40 million people who have become refugees since World War II, a considerable proportion have fled from Communist-occupied countries. The Soviet Union and its satellites persistently maintained that the answer to this problem was repatriation to be carried out through bilateral arrangements between the countries concerned. Only hard fought verbal battles in the United Nations won for refugees the right to determine for themselves whether or not to return to their country of origin. At the same time, in the 1946 General Assembly, the United Nations unanimously accepted the principle that European refugees other than those from Germany were the concern of the United Nations and that a non-permanent international agency should care for those refugees who did not wish to repatriate.

With these principles established, the members of the United Nations faced the pressing practical tasks of providing the ref-

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ugees with legal and political status, of maintaining them in the countries of refuge and subsequently of settling them there or elsewhere. To deal with these tasks, three different approaches were considered: to establish an agency directly under the General Assembly's own authority (Article 22 of the Charter); or a commission under the Economic and Social Council (Article 67 or 68); or a specialized agency which would be an autonomous body linked with the United Nations by a negotiated agreement.

The International Refugee Organization

The final decision was to choose the third alternative to meet the needs of the vast and pressing problems of those refugees created by World War II and its immediate aftermath, who had not been settled by the time UNRRA ceased to function. The United Nations General Assembly thus created the International Refugee Organization (IRO) as a non-permanent specialized agency to undertake these functions.

Though a wide variety of activities had been undertaken on behalf of refugees in the inter-war period, the accomplishments of the International Refugee Organization are outstanding because of the breadth and speed of the organization's operations, the all-encompassing nature of its responsibilities, and its humanitarian approach. During its four and a half years of effective action, the IRO assisted 1,619,000 refugees who were dispersed over more than 20 countries including some in the Middle East and the Far East, although its major work concerned refugees in Europe. Of this number, the IRO resettled 1,038,750 in more than 43 countries, most of which were overseas, and helped 72,834 to return to their former homes.

In the course of undertaking these tasks, the IRO ran a large number of camps which not only provided housing, feeding and medical care for their inhabitants but also, to the extent possible, rehabilitation and retraining. Since most of the refugees were stateless, the IRO provided them with a legal status. Since resettlement was its basic objective, the IRO negotiated agreements with overseas and European countries, brought the refugees to the places from which they could leave for their new homes, and with its own fleet transported them abroad. Thus IRO

became a worldwide welfare and migration organization which maintained responsibilities for those in its care until the refugees were permanently settled.

The establishment and financing of IRO was undertaken by 18 of the 54 member nations of the United Nations. These 18 countries contributed more than \$400 million to its functions, an essential element in its success and a high water mark of governmental assistance to refugees. Voluntary organizations also contributed immeasurably to the success of IRO's efforts. Nowhere in the history of international organization has there been more effective teamwork between voluntary agencies, governments and international staff.

The International Refugee Organization was concerned with European refugees. It did not wish, and indeed was hardly able, to assume responsibilities for refugees outside Europe. But the United Nations also found itself compelled to render aid to the vast numbers of people who were rendered homeless as a result of crises in which it had assumed an active political role. Following its pacification of the Palestine War, the United Nations established an operational agency in 1949 called the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); and after the police action in Korea, it established in 1951 the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). In both cases the tasks of the agencies were limited to providing food, shelter, health services, and such schooling and assistance to refugees as were necessary to enable them to become self-supporting, and neither legal protection nor overseas resettlement were involved in their services. By the time UNKRA's operations were terminated on June 30, 1959, the agency had aided nearly 700,000 refugees to build new homes or to rebuild war damaged ones and had extended relief to many more.

The Arab Refugees

The task of the agency for Palestine refugees has been still more difficult because of political tensions and difficulties of economic reestablishment. The economic problem is that 70 per cent of the Palestinian refugees were farmers moving into an area

which provided no opportunity for more farmers to gain their livelihood. Today half of the million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA are no older than 16. Though UNRWA has been able to provide stability among this potentially explosive group, even during the periods of emergency like the Suez Crisis in 1956, the disturbances in Lebanon in 1958, the tension in Jordan in 1957 and 1958, and the period of unrest in Syria, it has never had enough money for vocational education, university scholarships, and grants to develop skills through which the young refugees could become self-supporting.

During the whole period that the United Nations has assumed responsibility for the relief of Arab refugees, plans for their settlement have been immensely complicated by the political stalemate between Israel and the Arab countries. Continued efforts in the Political Committee of the General Assembly have failed to break the stalemate. With UNRWA's mandate extended until June 30, 1963, there is hope that rehabilitation and training will lead to a growing assimilation of refugees into the economies of Arab countries, in particular Syria and Iraq, and that in this way progress will be made towards reducing the problem.

Although the United Nations had found itself pressed into operational responsibilities for both the Korean and Arab refugees its objective was to free itself from such tasks. This was one of the reasons behind the liquidation of the International Refugee Organization. More important, however, was the fact that IRO was organized for large scale operations which were no longer suitable once its case load was substantially reduced. Also the governments which had been supporting IRO with such large amounts of money were eager to reduce their grants. As the refugee problem in Europe had been so much reduced in size through the successful operations of IRO, it was decided to turn over the remaining functions for refugees to two new organizations: the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

At the time that IRO was being liquidated, the International Labor Organization at a conference in Rome had proposed as-

suming responsibilities for European migration. Many of the governments which had been involved with the work of IRO, and particularly the United States, preferred to have European migration organized by an intergovernmental body within which the countries of Eastern Europe were not represented. Though its mandate has been a broad one, ICEM has, in fact, accomplished much for refugees. From February 1, 1952, to December 31, 1959, it transported 425,616 European refugees to overseas countries, nearly one half of its total case load during this period.

The U.N. High Commissioner

The responsibilities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were envisaged as being primarily to provide legal and political protection to the refugees under its mandate and to aid them by facilitating voluntary repatriation or assimilation within new national communities. It was not intended to be either a political or an operational body but rather to aid and coordinate efforts by other organizations like ICEM, government and voluntary agencies.

From the first moment of international concern for refugees, it had been recognized that an adequate legal status including, in particular, the right to work, was essential if refugees were to find permanent homes. The more rights a refugee is granted, the easier it is for him to become settled. Thus the enjoyment of a legal status has both moral and practical value. Under the initiative of the League of Nations a series of conventions had been developed for particular refugee groups and under the Constitution of the IRO the groups under its mandate received legal and political protection.

The most comprehensive definition of a refugee yet achieved, however, was framed by a United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on July 28, 1951, at Geneva and the Convention thus defined came into force on April 22, 1954. This Convention codifies minimum rights for refugees, such as access to the courts, the right to work, to education, to social security, to freedom of religion and movement and to engage in commercial activities. By April, 1960 this Convention had been accepted by 24

states including Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Australia, Belgium, Denmark and Yugoslavia. The United States has not acceded to the Convention but it has admitted refugees under the Displaced Persons Act and the Refugee Relief Act.

Useful as was this Convention, it was apparent that the UNHCR had also to provide practical emergency assistance to refugees. In February, 1952, the United Nations General Assembly authorized the UNHCR to appeal for funds for this purpose. In October, 1954, the United Nations Refugee Fund was established to finance a four-year program to aid the integration of refugees into the economies of their asylum countries and to provide institutional care for permanently incapacitated persons. This program was also much aided by a \$3,100,000 grant from the Ford Foundation for pilot projects in the local integration of refugees. These programs helped greatly to reduce to manageable proportions the problem of the "old" refugees. It became apparent that adequate housing near places where employment was available was one of the major keys to resettlement of refugees and that vocational training helped in coping with the problem.

Since 1956, new crises have arisen for which the United Nations High Commissioner has been given responsibilities. The Hungarian uprising in 1956 led to a new wave of refugees and the High Commissioner was made responsible for coordinating measures for emergency relief and for the reestablishment of these refugees. With the aid of ICEM and voluntary organizations over 170,000 Hungarians had been helped to emigrate to some 40 European and non-European countries by February, 1958. A further problem has been created by the Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco. For both these groups the UNHCR has coordinated and supervised relief programs of care and maintenance carried on by governments and non-governmental organizations. In both instances the operations have been financed through special funds.

Today it is widely recognized that material aid will be a recurring requirement not only for meeting new refugee emergencies but also for handling the existing refugee situa-

tion. This includes over 1.5 million refugees within the High Commissioner's mandate, of whom over one million¹ are in Europe; some 250,000 refugees from Algeria in Tunisia and Morocco; more than one million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong technically not within the UNHCR's mandate, but for whom the High Commissioner has been asked by the General Assembly to use his good offices to encourage contributions; and about one million Arab refugees under UNRWA. The large-scale efforts of the World Refugee Year are aimed at providing both funds and public concern for the refugees out of which, hopefully, will come a renewed and enlarged effort in the international community on their behalf.

Looking back it is apparent that experience in coping with successive refugee groups has led to certain conclusions about how the problem should be handled. After IRO was liquidated, it was still hoped that the United Nations' direct responsibility, apart from particular situations like those of the Korean and Palestinian refugees, could be reduced to legal and political protection, and that the international services for refugees, such as provided by ICEM and the voluntary agencies, would be needed only for a transitional period. However, events like the sudden exodus of Hungarians into adjacent countries, particularly to Austria and Yugoslavia, and the desperate plight of many refugees for whom the United Nations has not taken responsibility, have made a broader conception necessary.

In practice this broader conception has already been reflected in the more extensive services asked of the UNHCR, particularly for greater coordination of material assistance and for leadership in fund raising² in particular emergencies, like those of the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong and the Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco.

The United Nations is now attempting to approach the refugee problem on a worldwide basis through the World Refugee Year which is designed to awaken the consciences of governments and peoples. Under this stimulus, 72 states, 6 territories and 74 non-

¹ Of these refugees in Europe only some 90,000 out-of-camp refugees require material assistance, but all European refugees are still in need of international protection.

² Voluntary contributions from governments and private sources.

governmental organizations are developing programs for information and fund raising and specific projects to aid refugees. These efforts are stimulated and coordinated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. They aim at superseding the former "hand-to-mouth" method with a concentrated and more comprehensive approach which lays down objectives, priorities and targets.

Through its work for refugees, the United Nations has succeeded in releasing tensions, providing security and stability in explosive situations, mitigating human suffering, safeguarding dignity and freedom and eliminating an intolerable human waste, so that

many former refugees today enrich in various ways the communities in which they have become productive citizens. But it is high time that the Office of the UNHCR is put on a permanent basis, with enlarged authority and more funds. August Lindt has already shown what creative leadership he can give even with his present limited mandate. With a more settled and extended authority he can stimulate still further the constructive partnership of international organizations, national governments and voluntary organizations. This, then, should be matched by a permanent continuation of the type of effort now being organized for the WRY.

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Such an assessment is rarely made by the majority of nations, who for their own political reasons extend types of assistance which may be ill advised or ineffectual.

United Nations action in Laos underscores the fact that the United Nations indeed enjoys prestige and exercises a truly beneficial influence. The Laotian experience suggests, indeed, requires that greater use be made of the United Nations and the valuable "pres-

ence" it is capable of creating. This presence may restrain political passions and ambitions, and may assist in the economic development of the "have not" countries, without the competitive cold war rivalries which each year give rise to mounting tensions. In brief, since the United Nations can reduce tensions, as in the case of the Kingdom of Laos, let us make increasing use of it.

"Under the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, institutions for the peaceful composing of differences among nations and for law-giving exist in the international community. Our primary problem today is not the creation of new international institutions, but the fuller and more fruitful use of the institutions we already possess.

"The International Court of Justice is a case in point. Its relative lack of judicial business—in its 12-year history an average of only two cases a year have come before the tribunal of fifteen outstanding international jurists—underlines the untried potentialities of this Court. While it would be foolish to suppose that litigation before the Court is the answer to all the world's problems, this method of settling disputes could profitably be employed in a wider range of cases than is presently done.

"As the President indicated in his State of the Union message, it is time for the United States to reexamine its own position with regard to the Court. Clearly all disputes regarding domestic matters must remain permanently within the jurisdiction of our own courts. Only matters which are essentially international in character should be referred to the International Court. But the United States reserved the right to determine unilaterally whether the subject matter of a particular dispute is within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States and is therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court. As a result of this position on our part, other nations have adopted similar reservations. This is one of the major reasons for the lack of judicial business before the Court."

—Richard M. Nixon, Vice-President of the United States, in an address delivered in New York City, April 13, 1959.

"The United Nations . . . has . . . no power or will apart from that of its major members," writes this author, commenting on the failure of the U.N. in the Hungarian crisis. "Thus, criticism of the United Nations turns out in truth to be criticism of the great powers, not of the United Nations."

The Hungarian Question

By A. F. K. ORGANSKI

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SINCE 1945, the United Nations has become an old hand at colonial problems. Indonesia, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine—the list of colonies that argued as well as fought their way to freedom could be made long indeed. Some of the new states had an easy birth and some had a lengthy struggle over many years, but in the end the result was much the same: a new state had been born. This was clearly the pattern of colonial questions at the United Nations. Hungary was one of very few failures of the United Nations in the colonial field.

The Hungarian case was different in that Soviet colonialism is a new brand of imperialism with different aims and methods. It is a colonialism born in the twentieth century, begun when all the other overlords were packing and going home. Russian rulers still believe passionately in their own colonial mission although they do not acknowledge it to be such; they are bent on modernizing and on changing their colonies no matter what the cost to those they rule. The Hungarian tragedy was proof of the strength of this new form of colonial domination.

Hungary is an important case because it showed that the road to freedom traversed by the colonies of the Western powers is closed to the satellites of the Soviet Union. The Hungarian question is also a good case study of the uses to which the machinery of the United Nations can be put. Most of all, Hungary is a saddening case. For 12 days all of Hungary writhed in an anguished attempt to break her bonds. Workers rose against exploitation, intellectuals against thought control, all rose against Soviet imperialism, but to no avail. Angry and help-

less, the United Nations watched the slaughter and wrote the story of the Hungarian question.

A Sketch of the Revolt

Ironically enough, the most immediate reason for the revolt was Khrushchev's attempt to expand the narrowly rigid channels through which life ran behind the Iron Curtain during the Stalin era. Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, the admission that the famous treason trials were frauds, the condemnation of Stalin's annihilation of the opposition inevitably had far reaching repercussions in Eastern Europe, where systems parallel to Stalin's regime had been developed at Stalin's instigation. The effects of Russia's sudden relaxation were dramatic. In Poland there were strikes and disorders. The Stalinists were pushed out of control, and anti-Stalinist Wladyslaw Gomulka returned to power and courageously resisted Russian efforts to bring the Poles to heel.

Stalinists in Hungary had also followed the new Russian lead. They admitted errors in Socialist construction, they admitted that some of their own trials for treason had been mistakes, they rehabilitated the dead. Inevitably the hold of the regime upon the unhappy mass of the population began to weaken. Resentful of foreign dom-

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ination, wearied and angered by the forced pace of industrialization thrust upon them and the deprivation it entailed, the Hungarians were seething with discontent. Polish success had its effect on Hungary. Sympathetic movements were started. The general unrest soon found the necessary incident, and the deep, long pent-up opposition to the regime came hissing out and boiling over.

The revolt that followed may be divided into four phases. There was the initial fight won by the rebels. The second phase was an armed truce. The Russian counterattack and the crushing of the revolt constituted the third phase. There was then a period of sullen passive resistance after the fight was over.

The armed revolt began on the night of October 23, 1956, when the political police fired on demonstrators in front of the radio station in Budapest. The crowd fought back and Russian help was called after the Hungarian army refused to act, wavered, then sided with the demonstrators. The fight between the population and the Russians, helped by the remnants of the political police, continued until the Russian troops began their withdrawal on October 30. Then came the unofficial truce. The Russians used the truce to mass their armor for a counterattack and began the assault before dawn on November 4. Phase three was short. By November 5 the revolt was crushed, and in the next two or three days the last pockets of resistance were eliminated. The population turned to strikes and passive resistance but had to abandon even these because of Soviet repression, wholesale deportations and acute economic need.

The outline of major political events ran as follows. Immediately after the revolt began, Imre Nagy, identified in the public mind with opposition to the harsh social and economic measures of Stalinist industrialization, was recalled to power. At the direct intervention of the Kremlin, the Stalinist Gerö was replaced by Janos Kadar as secretary of the Communist party. Nagy's attempts to restore order by restraining the Russians and persuading the freedom fighters to lay down their arms and the workers to return to work appeared to have succeeded when Russian tanks lumbered out of the smoking ruins of Budapest.

Hopes of success were brief, however. As Russian troops crossed the Hungarian border on their way out, many more troops entered Hungary from Russia and Rumania. Seeing the Russians deaf to his entreaties that they withdraw their troops, Nagy in despair, denounced the Warsaw Pact that formally binds the European Communist countries into a bloc, declared Hungary neutral, and appealed through the United Nations to the great powers to guarantee his country's neutral status. There was no answer to his appeal from either East or West. On November 3, the Russians arrested the Hungarian military mission which had come at Russian request to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops. On the next day at dawn, the Russians counterattacked. Janos Kadar, who had deserted the Nagy government secretly some days before, announced the formation of a new government in opposition to that of Imre Nagy. Kadar's new government was backed by the Soviet Union.

The epilogue of the revolt was as tragic as the rest of its brief story. Final resistance was smashed by very brutal means. The workers' councils that had emerged as institutions of effective governmental power during the revolt and that were the center of the resistance afterwards were soon reduced to impotence. Resistance ceased. Some of the leaders of the revolt escaped. Others hid. Nagy was kidnapped by the Russians and executed.

The United Nations in Action

The treatment of the Hungarian case in the United Nations was similar to the handling of many other cases. The case first went to the Security Council. When the Council could not reach a decision, the case was transferred to an emergency session of the General Assembly under a new procedure set up by the *Uniting for Peace* Resolution in 1950. The General Assembly has continued to occupy itself with the problem to this day. Early in the case some of the specialized agencies were also called upon to give assistance.

Surprisingly, there was little action by the United Nations during the first two phases of the revolt. The Security Council was called together at the request of the United

States, the United Kingdom and France on October 27 and met the next day, some five days after the revolt had begun. At the Security Council meeting the Western powers reviewed the information on the rebellion up to that date. The denunciation of the Soviet Union by most of the members of the Council was categorical. The Soviet Union for its part protested that the Council had no business discussing the question at all since it was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign member of the United Nations. Indeed, the Nagy government had protested the inclusion of the Hungarian case on the Security Council agenda the day before. The Russian representative also argued that his country was helping Hungary to put down the revolt at the express request of the Hungarian government.

The discussion came to no conclusion. Nor did it reach any conclusion on November 2, when the Council met again. By then, some 2,500 Russian tanks had surrounded Budapest and the main Hungarian provincial cities. Russian troops had occupied air-fields, railroads, key cross roads, all across the unhappy Hungarian land. Nagy had sent an anguished appeal to the four great powers, through the Security Council, to protect the new Hungarian neutrality, and a second message giving particulars of Russian military movements arrived while the Council was in session and was circulated. Nevertheless, the Council did not act, and it was not until the next day, on November 3, that a resolution was even presented. The vote on it was postponed still further.

Council debates were sharp and exchanges caustic. The Russians were on the defensive, for it was now impossible for them to claim that Russian troops were in Hungary because the Hungarian government had expressly asked for them. Russia's intention to attack was plain, and *faux de mieux* the Soviet representative advanced the absurd explanation that Soviet forces had reentered Hungary to protect evacuating Russian civilians. The majority castigated the Soviet Union time and again. How hurt the Soviets were, however, is hard to say.

On November 3, the Council adjourned for two days, but was dramatically reconvened a few hours later when news of the Russian assault was received. The Council

met before dawn on November 4 for its last session on the Hungarian question. The Council acted quickly, perhaps prodded by the knowledge that due to the time difference Russian tanks had already put in an eight hour day on the streets of Budapest. Perhaps its speed was a reaction to the anguished cries for help coming over the press wires and the radio from Hungarian fighters: "Nagy and the Government and the whole people ask help . . . Long live Hungary and Europe! . . . Any news about help? Quickly, quickly, quickly! . . . Imre Nagy personally asks help. . . . And diplomatic steps, diplomatic steps." "To all UN members and delegates! . . . Our country has been attacked from abroad. We turn to you. You are our last citadel of hope . . . We appeal to your conscience and call on you to act immediately."¹

The Council did not act; it could not. The resolution proposed by the United States was lost because of the Russian veto. All the majority could do, it did. It tongue-lashed the Soviet Union and turned the case over to an emergency session of the General Assembly. The same morning the new government of Kadar requested that the Hungarian question be removed from the agenda of the Council.

General Assembly Emergency Session

The General Assembly met at 4:31 P.M. of the same day and by 8:10, after a massive condemnation of Russian action, adopted the very points contained in the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council. The Assembly called on the Soviet Union to stop its attack on Hungary and to halt the introduction of military forces into the country. The Assembly affirmed the right of Hungary to have a government responsive to its wishes, requested the Secretary General to investigate the Hungarian problem and to suggest ways of ending foreign intervention, and called upon Hungary and the Soviet Union to allow the observers to enter Hungary and to travel undisturbed. The Secretary General was also to investigate the need for food and medical supplies.

The Assembly met again in emergency session on November 9. By that time all

¹ Melvin J. Lasky, ed., *A White Book, The Hungarian Revolution* (London: Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., 1957), pp. 230, 240.

vestige of armed resistance had ceased. The Russians and the Hungarians had paid no heed to the earlier resolution. Three resolutions were passed adjusting Assembly requests to the new situation. Requests to Russia to stop attacking Hungary were dropped, for the fight was over. Most other points were reaffirmed, and the Secretary General was asked to arrange with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for effective aid to the Hungarians who had fled across the border.

On November 12, the General Assembly began its regular session. The Assembly continued to be concerned with the Hungarian question, and the issue has been on the Assembly's agenda ever since.

In the four years it has been seized with the Hungarian question, the Assembly has set itself four tasks: to investigate, to force Hungary and the Soviet Union to comply with Assembly resolutions, to condemn the guilty, and to give relief.

The Assembly has been largely successful in its attempts to investigate the situation in Hungary. Most of the long story has been pieced together in spite of the fact that Assembly representatives have never been allowed on Hungarian soil. Sir Leslie Munro, the last of the agents of the Assembly, has been asked to keep on trying.

On the other hand, attempts to make the Soviet Union and Kadar's Hungarian government comply with the Assembly resolutions have come to nought. Resolution after resolution has called in vain on the two nations to comply. Hungary has withdrawn behind the constitutional position that the matter is a question of domestic jurisdiction and the interference of the United Nations is illegal. The Russians claim this is a matter for the Hungarians to deal with.

For their noncompliance the two countries have been condemned directly and indirectly by the General Assembly but to no avail. This noncompliance is likely to continue. It is clear that the two Communist governments hope that the United Nations will eventually become preoccupied with other things and end this diplomatic war.

Finally, the General Assembly helped to arrange relief on a major scale both to the people of Hungary immediately after the fight and to the flood of refugees who left the

country. Tens of thousands of these refugees have been given new homes, new hope and a new life.

How then is one to judge the record of the United Nations in the Hungarian revolt? If the expectation was that the United Nations should by some means have saved Hungary from being crushed by Soviet arms—and this expectation was held by many at the time of the revolt—then, unquestionably, the United Nation's record is a sorry one.

Such a hope, however, was a fantasy motivated by anger and despair. The United Nations had (and has) no power or will apart from that of its major members. With the United States unwilling to use force and take the risk of war, there was clearly no hope of stopping Russia, who was willing to fight to retain Hungary. When Russia decided to commit her armed forces and when Nagy's appeal for protection went unheeded by the Western powers, Hungary was doomed. Thus, criticism of the United Nations turns out in truth to be criticism of the great powers, not of the United Nations.

Some observers have compared the Hungarian case to that of Egypt, which occurred at the same time, and in which great powers were stopped in their aggression without a war. But the image of United Nations power in the Egyptian case is a mirage. Egypt's aggressors, England, France and Israel, were all countries heavily dependent on the United States, and the United States used that dependency as a lever to make them stop without the use of force. It was the United States, not the United Nations, that made the aggressors halt and retrace their steps. Russia, however, was not dependent on the United States, and there was no way the United States could stop her if it did not want to fight.

However, one may still ask whether the machinery of the United Nations was used to the best advantage, if everything short of war was done, and no clear answer can be given to this question. There are one or two matters that do not entirely satisfy. There is the uncertainty as to why the Security Council was not brought together until the end of the first phase of the revolt, and as to why, once convened, the Security Council postponed decision until the morning of November 4, some 12 days after the revolt began.

It may be that in view of its firm decision not to intervene with arms, the United States realized that there was nothing for the West to do but to condemn the U.S.S.R. after it had acted. This would explain the late start, the rare meetings, and the many postponements of decision.

Or it may be that the Western powers were influenced by what had happened in Poland. Like the Hungarians, the Poles had dared defy the Russians and had run the risk of being crushed, but the Poles had succeeded in staying the Russian hand by negotiation. Perhaps the West hoped that the Hungarians would be as successful as the Poles. Thus while there was hope of negotiation, and to the anxious world this hope existed until the Russian counterattack, the West was unwilling to chance enraging the Russians by United Nations intervention.

It could, perhaps, be argued plausibly that deep Western disunity over the Anglo-French attack on Egypt was responsible for the delay in beginning discussion of the Hungarian question. However, this would not explain the postponements in decision once the Council had convened. It is more likely that the risk of war, the confusion attending the American election only days away, and the hope that Hungary would escape the Russian vise without danger or trouble to the United States, rather than Allied disunity, were the factors leading to U.N. inaction.

The question also arises as to whether American leaders were not uncomfortably aware that had the parts been reversed, had a Communist revolt broken out in say Italy or Turkey (or Lebanon?), we, too might have used our troops to put down the rebellion, as the British did in Greece.

There is another aspect of the Hungarian case that needs attention. This is the moral position taken by the West. Certainly the fact that two Western powers were themselves involved in bare aggression undermined the effectiveness of the Western case against the Russians. To be sure, the world believed the Western accusations. Russian brutality in putting down the rebellion, Russian duplicity in promising to negotiate withdrawal of Soviet forces, and, finally the abduction and execution of the leaders of the revolt spoke for themselves. However, to hear the British and the French accuse the

Russians seemed to many to hear the pot calling the kettle black. To most nations, the Anglo-French assertion that they had invaded Egypt to limit the war between Egyptians and Israelis was comparable to the Russians' claim that they had entered Hungary to restore peace and order.

The Hungarian case offered to the West an opportunity rare in the history of the United Nations. Western quarrels often end up in the lap of the United Nations, where Russia has an opportunity to make propaganda capital out of the problem. On the other hand, there are usually no open quarrels between governments behind the iron curtain. But for four days the Hungarian government came out openly against the Soviet Union and called in the United Nations to boot. It will be recalled that before November 1, Nagy had been against United Nations discussion of the question on the usual ground that the Hungarian revolt was a Hungarian affair. After November 4, Kadar again closed the iron curtain on the same ground, but for four days the West had an opportunity that probably will never occur again and let it slip by unused.

No evaluation of the way United Nations machinery was used in the Hungarian case would be complete without some mention of two ways in which the United Nations usually distinguishes itself after an international fight. Again in the Hungarian case, the United Nations picked up the pieces after the fight was over and wrote the minutes of the events.

Picking up the pieces after a fight may not seem sufficient to a world anxious to avoid fights altogether, but it should be remembered that the pieces were human beings. The relief and refugee activities of the United Nations aided the real victims of the revolt.

Setting down what happened may seem even less important. However, it is a major function of the United Nations. It is the mission a Hungarian freedom fighter asked for when he tapped on the A.P. wire:

Please tell the world of the treacherous attack against our struggle for liberty. . . . SOS!
—SOS!—SOS!—

The U.N. told the world, but it could not answer the call for help. If there is one truth about the United Nations the Hungarian case drives home it is that the United Nations writes history but does not make it.

Noting that "the emergence of the African Personality on the international plane has meant an accession of prestige and influence for the international organization itself," this specialist analyzes the reasons why "the relationship between African nationalism and the United Nations is likely to prove beneficial to both."

African Nationalism and the United Nations

By KEITH IRVINE
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THE impact of African nationalism upon the United Nations has indubitably increased the universality of the organization and has thus enhanced the potential of the United Nations for maintaining peace. In effect, there has always been an organic link between nationalism and universality—between regional affirmation and a concept of international harmony. By the same token, African nationalism is organically linked to the history of international organization.

Hard as the struggle for African nationalism may have appeared to those who have been engaged in it, it has nevertheless proceeded at an extraordinary pace. W. E. B. DuBois, lobbying at the Versailles Peace Conference for international supervision of the former German African colonies, may have appeared to the Clemenceaus, Lloyd Georges and Wilsons of his day as a utopian radical far removed from political realities. The fact remains that while the experienced statesmen of that day, as well as their ideas, have vanished and gone, Dubois, now in his nineties, may yet live to see the nationalist cause triumph throughout the African continent.

The outcome of the second world war provided the occasion to put into practice ideas which had matured during the long war years. As the late George Padmore has written: "If the war years can be described as the coming-of-age period of Pan-Africanism, 1945 and after represents the beginning of its triumph and achievement." Nineteen forty-five was also the year of the San Fran-

cisco Conference. On October 24, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations came into force. In the same month the historic Fifth Pan-African Conference was held in Manchester, England. Nineteen forty-five was indeed a year of beginnings.

Only four states on the African continent were among the original 51 members of the United Nations—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South Africa. Only the first three can be considered representative of African nationalism. Furthermore, these three states, from the smallness of their numbers, and from the circumstances in which they found themselves placed, were precluded from making any dynamic approaches to the problem of African independence. Their role was rather to conserve and to defend, and their attitudes to questions posed by other African territories were often, perforce, conditioned by attitudes of other members of the international community. The individuals who were to form the future leaven of African nationalism—Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Kenyatta, and others—

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had yet to make their mark on the international consciousness. During the first decade of the United Nations, therefore, the greater part of Africa remained under colonial domination. Dependent territories were defined either as Trust Territories, or as Non-Self-Governing Territories. In both cases the possibilities of the United Nations exercising influence was limited by the provisions of the Charter, and by the appropriate Trusteeship Agreements. A great dyke of colonial construction prevented the insurgence of African nationalism onto the international level. Nationalistic revolts, whether in Kenya or in North Africa, were *a priori* considered by the majority of states to fall within the province of the colonial power concerned, rather than within the domain of the United Nations.

For all its superficial appearance of immobility, however, the world was changing. North African states were in the process of winning their independence, and in Asia the situation had altered almost out of recognition since 1945. These changes finally found a reflection at the United Nations in the famous "Package Deal" whereby, on December 14, 1955, 16 new states were admitted to the United Nations. Although only one of them—Libya—was an African state, the internal equilibrium of the United Nations was decisively altered in such a manner as to favor the emergence of new African states. Indeed, on November 12, 1956, no less than three new African states—the Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia—were admitted to U.N. membership. All three states were in Northern Africa. The fact that the emergency session of the General Assembly which dealt with the Suez crisis ended a mere two days before their admission, psychologically did much to emphasize that African states were still liable to be subjected to the dangers of foreign invasion, and secondly that the United Nations provided some degree of protection against these dangers. This common realization did much to permit the crystallization of a certain African unity of view later, despite superficial differences of approach.

The independence of Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) which was proclaimed on March 6, 1957, was widely recognized as the clarion call which heralded the opening

of a new era for Africa. Ghana's admission to the United Nations followed two days later, due to the coincidence that the General Assembly was still in session. As with other African states, however, a certain time lag ensued between the titular assumption of a role in the United Nations and the full exercise of powers.

Accra Conference

Events in Africa were nonetheless proceeding apace, and the increasing upsurge of nationalism led to the convening of the first Conference of Independent African States in April, 1958. Excluding South Africa, which declined the invitation to attend, eight independent African states gathered at Accra, and passed a number of important resolutions which laid the foundations for the future action of African nationalism on a governmental level. Among these resolutions was one which called for the co-ordination of "all matters of common concern to the African states" at the United Nations, where the Permanent Representatives of the African governments found themselves in convenient propinquity. The name given to this co-ordinating body was the Informal Permanent Machinery of the Independent African States. In practice this formed a sub-group of the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations, which in turn had come into being as a neutralist caucus at the time of the Korean War, and which later became more institutionalized as a result of the Bandung Conference in 1955.

As with all new institutions, whether of states or groups of states, there was a time lapse between initial establishment and smooth functioning. The often swift pace of inter-related developments at the United Nations put fresh strains upon most member states. Chronologically, however, the first severe strain for the group of eight African states was the Jordan-Lebanon crisis of 1958, in the course of which divergences of view appeared among all groups. The recognition of the existence of these divergences led to further efforts to consolidate unity, above all on African questions.

It was clear that the most immediate African question on the United Nations agenda was the question of the war in Algeria. In Algeria, as in Tunisia and Morocco, the

struggle of the nationalist forces for independence led at first, despite the opposition of France and her colonial allies, to the inscription of the problem on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly. This, in turn, led to the adoption of resolutions which, as the expression of the opinion of the majority of the governments of U.N. member states, exerted some degree of influence upon the French government. It may be stressed, however, that with regard to the problems of all three North African territories, progress towards solutions was primarily due to the readiness of the populations to fight for their independence, and to reject compromise solutions which fell short of independence.

The Algerian War

On November 1, 1954, the Algerian revolution began. By the following year, 1955, events of such gravity had occurred that the "Question of Algeria" was placed on the agenda of the Assembly for the first time. French opposition was so strong, however, that a resolution was passed which decided not to consider this question further at that session. As 1956 was both the year of the United States presidential election and also of the Suez crisis, the question of Algeria was postponed until the spring of 1957. The situation in Algeria had by this time deteriorated to such an extent that a lengthy debate took place on the subject, in which both Morocco and Tunisia, who had meanwhile both become members of the U.N., participated. France opened the debate with a 114-page speech in which the French Foreign Minister stated that France could if necessary manage to live without Algeria, but that Algeria could not live without France. A cease-fire on the part of the rebels would be followed by elections to which France would invite observers from democratic countries. The representatives elected would be members of the French National Assembly, but also persons with whom the French government could discuss the future regime in Algeria. Any suggestion of United Nations intervention was rejected.

In reply Syria made a strong attack on French policy in Algeria, as having resulted in the impoverishment of Algerians and the enrichment of French settlers. The settlers ran not only Algeria, but also French policy

in Algeria. What the French called "pacification" was a policy of war and repression. The best solution was that already arrived at for Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya—independence. Other nations then added their voices to the debate, thus in effect further "internationalizing" the Algerian question. A resolution was then passed which stated that the General Assembly "having heard the statements made by various delegations and discussed the question of Algeria," and "having regard to the situation in Algeria which is causing much suffering and loss of human lives, expresses the hope that, in a spirit of cooperation, a peaceful democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." These vague and undefined terms were the best compromise that could be obtained at that time.

At the next Assembly, held in the fall of 1957, a further resolution was passed which expressed "again concern," which took "note of the offer of good offices made by His Majesty the King of Morocco and His Excellency the President of the Republic of Tunisia," and which expressed "the wish that in a spirit of effective cooperation, pourparlers will be entered into, and other appropriate means utilized, with a view to a solution, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." This was the last occasion on which any resolution has been passed by the United Nations concerning Algeria.

In the following year, 1958, France boycotted all meetings concerned with Algeria, and both French and Algerians made their views known through the agency of other governments. A 17-power Afro-Asian draft resolution was put forward recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence, expressing concern with the continuance of the war, considering that the present situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security, taking note of the willingness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with the Government of France, and urging negotiations between the two parties. After this resolution had passed through the committee stage (at which the undoctored opinions of governments are ex-

pressed), it was decided to soften the resolution in order to ensure passage through the Assembly (where, after the committee vote has been evaluated, voting takes place in the light of power-political realities). In one of the most interesting votes taken at the United Nations on a colonial question, the draft resolution was then defeated by falling short of the required two-thirds majority by a single vote. Had even one of the six stragglers from the Afro-Asian-Latin group (that is to say Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Israel, Laos, Nicaragua, or Paraguay) abstained instead of supporting France, there is no saying precisely what path subsequent events concerning Algeria might or might not have taken. It is thus ironical to reflect that had Castro come to power in Cuba a few weeks before he did, events on the African continent might perhaps have taken a different course. It was not, however, to be.

Seeing defeat writ clear on the agenda of the 1959 Assembly if France maintained its position, President de Gaulle on September 16, 1959, offered Algeria self-determination subject to certain conditions. This step neutralized much of the pressure on France at the United Nations to negotiate a settlement by providing wavering nations with the technical excuse that France had now offered Algeria self-determination, and had better not find herself hampered in her efforts to restore peace by United Nations "interference."

With the question of "self-determination for Algeria" thus theoretically removed, the problem of Algeria at the United Nations in 1959 turned upon whether or not any mention should be made of a dispute existing between "two parties." In the committee stage a resolution passed that called for pourparlers between the two parties for a cease-fire and concerning the territory's political future. Pakistan, however, introduced a diluted version of this resolution which asked merely for "conversations," without mentioning between whom any "conversations" were to take place. Only this resolution was brought to the vote in the Assembly, and even this was defeated. In 1959 as in 1958 no resolution whatsoever was passed by the Assembly. Yet whereas in 1958 a moral victory was won by the Algerians, in 1959 France fought a successful diplomatic delaying action.

Meanwhile the war entered its sixth year, and in the months which followed France exploded nuclear weapons, and the recruitment of African volunteers for the war in Algeria was begun.

It may be said that Algeria might—had the political circumstances in France, or the legal status of Algeria been clearer—have gained independence after two or three years of national struggle, as was the case with Tunisia and Morocco. The fact that France had laid a legal claim to incorporating Algeria as a "part of France," however, precluded the type of settlement that was reached with respect to Tunisia or Morocco. Consequently France was left to "burn in the flames" of Algerian nationalism, with no clear path of escape open from her self-created predicament. Under these conditions the problem became increasingly internationalized, until finally a point was reached at which no settlement appeared possible without the concurrence of the great powers.

It remains to be seen whether the settlement of the Algerian problem will ultimately be achieved in conjunction with the United Nations; whether its outcome will depend upon parleys between the great powers (as in the case of the war in Indo-China); or whether it will become merged in some larger crisis, together with other apparently insoluble African problems, such as the race conflict in South Africa. In this respect the fact that white South Africans have been receiving training in methods of warfare used by the French against the Algerian population could prove prophetic, although this is hardly a consummation to be wished.

"The African Assembly"

Meanwhile, the African states' influence upon the United Nations is growing with the addition of new members from the African family of nations. In 1958, increasing activity by African states, within the framework provided by the Afro-Asian group culminated in successful action to support the admission of a new African state—Guinea—to the United Nations and led to the 1958 Assembly being christened by its President, Charles Malik, the "African Assembly." The entry of Guinea into the United Nations, following shortly after the Ghana-Guinea Joint Declaration of November 23, 1958, added a new

element. After the example of Ghana, the independence of Guinea also represented the advantages of following the Pan-African lodestar, particularly for many of the peoples of the French-speaking African territories.

It became obvious to most African governments that a breach had been made in the colonial dyke, and that under the pressure of the Pan-African tide, the dyke itself would soon be swept away. Even as the Africa group was exerting efforts to ensure the admission of Guinea, the First All African People's Conference was meeting in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958—a conference that was still further to accelerate the chain reaction. The following month nationalist activity versus colonial repression in the Belgian Congo resulted in riots that proclaimed to Brussels and to the world at large that the Belgian practice of paternalism in the Congo offered no alternative to the inevitable outcome—African independence.

In February, 1959, the General Assembly reconvened for an extended session to consider the future of the Cameroons. Trusting to the report of a triennial visiting mission, the colonial powers supported France in refusing to permit the French Cameroon to have free elections under United Nations supervision before independence. Although technically a defeat, the result provided a moral victory for the African states—firstly because it was demonstrated that they were capable of achieving virtual unanimity even when subjected to strong pressure, and secondly because subsequent popular discontent, which caused grave troubles within the territory, showed that when it came to understanding African affairs, it was the African states who understood the situation best.

Further inter-African conferences were held in the course of 1959, each of which exerted its effect upon the external policies of the African states. The Prime Ministers of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia met at Saniquellie in July, 1959, further to harmonize their efforts. The following month the foreign ministers of the African states met again in Monrovia.

At the 1959 Assembly, the African states won a clear victory with the passage of the resolution expressing grave concern over the intention of France to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara, and requesting her to refrain

from such tests. On other questions a feeling of anticipation prevailed, together with a growing recognition that events in Africa were continuing to accelerate. The opening of the period of flux and change, predicted by so many for 1960, was marked by the Sharpeville shootings of March 21 in South Africa, an event which attracted international attention to the situation in the Union. On that occasion vigorous action by the African states and their friends in taking the matter to the Security Council resulted in the passage of a resolution which called on South Africa to abandon its policies of apartheid. But, as was pointed out, this was evidently merely a prelude to further developments.

Independent Africa Grows

Meanwhile it had become clear that by the end of 1960 the political situation in Africa was liable to have changed out of recognition. The independence of the former French Cameroon was proclaimed on January 1. Other territories would follow: French Togo on April 27, the Belgian Congo on June 30, Somalia on July 1, and the Federation of Nigeria on October 1. Independence was due for both the Federation of Mali and for the Malagasy Republic. Thus it became clear that at least seven new African states might be expected to seek United Nations membership at the fifteenth General Assembly, due to open in September. It was difficult to forecast what form the foreign policies of these states might take, and impossible to foretell precisely how the personalities of these different states might interact upon one another. Taking into consideration the fact that the independence of so many territories in Africa might be expected to produce further nationalist reactions in territories still remaining under colonial administration, it appeared to many that the wisest course might be to await the outcome of these various developments rather than to base policy decisions upon advance calculations.

Certain conclusions may, however, tentatively be drawn from the consideration of the role of the various independent African states at the United Nations.

1. The African states as a whole have no intention of becoming involved in the cold

war between East and West. This has been made clear by most of them on a great number of occasions, and explains why on many occasions African states abstained on certain issues before the United Nations. These issues were considered to be purely of concern to the "cold war" warriors, and to have been artificially introduced not in the hope of arriving at solutions of problems, but solely in the hope of gaining tactical advantage.

2. The African states have, however, shown themselves to be keenly concerned, and are likely to become increasingly so, with problems of economic development. The participation of African governments in the first two sessions of the Economic Commission for Africa, which first met in December, 1958, is likely to stimulate coordinated efforts to lay the foundations for the economic development of the continent in the decade which lies ahead—as, in the past decade, the foundations for the present rapid political advance were laid.

3. The debacle of the colonialist philosophy has created a situation in which often only a token resistance is offered by the retreating forces. Increasingly forceful action by the African states at the United Nations may therefore be expected to produce some dramatic changes in some long-outstanding questions concerning Africa.

4. The development of African national-

ism has further strengthened the fabric of international society. African nationalism has tended to increase the demand for the representation of China to be considered, for questions of self-determination to be accentuated, for racialism to be opposed. Africa's emergence, in a phrase, has strengthened internationalism.

From this it follows that the emergence of the African Personality on the international plane has meant an accession of prestige and influence for the international organization itself. Whatever limitations may have been imposed by the Charter—and the Charter was drafted at a time when even far-seeing persons were preoccupied primarily with the problems of Asia, rather than of Africa—the fact remains that to a great extent independent African states place their trust in the United Nations. They look to it as a forum where, in the eyes of the world, their interests are less likely to be betrayed, and also as an institution which will play an important role in their advancement in the years ahead. For these immediate reasons, as well as for the pervasive influence which is constantly at work upon the ideological level, the relationship between African nationalism and the United Nations is likely to prove beneficial to both. Out of this relationship may, indeed, emerge the shape of a new and harmonious balance of interests in the world of tomorrow.

"... We developed a capacity to destroy any nation of the world at will, as a deterrent force. And let us note right here that the use of nuclear weapons is the basis of American strategy for the preservation of peace. Nuclear weapons are our security as a nation. Therefore we can't say we can't use nuclear weapons and can't think about it. Because that is our strategy as a nation; that is our policy. So we have got to recognize that they are a factor in the world.

* * *

"And as shown by . . . figures, which were developed with the Army, the C.I.A., Civil Defense and other groups, eight to fifteen million lives can be saved in New York State by having shelters in the event of a nuclear attack. That can be done by us as citizens in this state. . . . That would cost less than one hundred dollars per person.

"Now, that is less than many . . . spend on . . . automobile insurance for one year. There was a big battle over compulsory automobile insurance; now it is an accepted fact. Nobody kicks now about vaccination for their children; that was terrible, too, in the beginning."

—Nelson A. Rockefeller, *Governor of the State of New York, an address, Importance of Shelters in Nuclear Age, delivered in New York City, March 4, 1960.*

Received At Our Desk

POLITICAL REALISM AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS: AN AMERICAN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY. By KENNETH W. THOMPSON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. 261 pages, index and selected readings, \$5.00.)

Since 1945 an approach to international politics has emerged that is usually described by its proponents as political realism. "It is an approach which expresses deep and grave misgivings concerning the main currents of popular and public writing and thinking on international relations. It represents a reaction against a viewpoint dominated by legalistic and moralistic points of emphasis." To encourage a more realistic awareness of the realities of international life, the author has undertaken an analysis "first, of the origins of political realism as an approach to American foreign policy, and, secondly, of its implications for the major unresolved fundamental problems of America's relations with the rest of the world."

Dr. Thompson notes that the great statesmen of the past have been those who have grasped the fact that there are integral relationships between theory and practice, "that an understanding of political phenomena, whether international or domestic, is inseparable from a clear picture of human nature," that progress cannot be equated with perfectibility, and that knowledge of a "viable, workable concept of politics" is essential. He then proceeds to analyze in particular the concepts of Nicholas J. Spykman, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Edward H. Carr. This, in turn, leads him to reflect upon the factors influencing the formulation of policy. The postulates for "political realism" are set forth with clarity and conviction; and the formula for a successful policy is stated, namely "executive leadership, honesty as to goals

and limitations, and the replacing of a fatuous moralism that misleads the people, confuses our allies, and deceives our foes." But the specifics of such a policy are not attempted, leading the reader with stimulating concepts but no concrete proposals.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

THE RELUCTANT SATELLITES. By LESLIE B. BAIN. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 233 pages, \$3.95.)

In this report of change and challenge in Eastern Europe during the crisis year of 1956, an able, perceptive observer writes about an exciting, dramatic, and tragic period. Mr. Bain's sketches of and conversations with key Communist leaders make interesting reading. He traces the impact of Khrushchev's secret speech, delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February, 1956, on developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary and Poland. The Communists interviewed invariably blamed Stalin for the ills of the area; they implied that there would be a return to Communist idealism. Then came the Polish and Hungarian revolutions.

The author's appraisal of encounters with the American Embassy Staff during the summer of 1956 amounts to a condemnation of their stupidity, myopia, and inertia. "Our officials in Budapest and elsewhere were not only indoctrinated in the idea of a life-or-death struggle between the East and West, but were also hemmed in by their own fears." Accordingly, they remained isolated from the intellectual ferment characteristic of that period. He further notes that "it has long been known among American newspapermen that the legation in Budapest was in the business of selling its views and interpretation of Hungarian events to visiting reporters.

Those who accepted them were favored and much courted; those who insisted on independent investigation were frowned upon, particularly if what they found was not quite what the legation wanted them to find."

This is an excellent reportorial account of a momentous period by a seeking, imaginative, and well-informed correspondent.

A.Z.R.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES, 1918-1940. By ALBERT N. TARULIS. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. 276 pages and index, \$4.75.)

Small nations have usually paid a high price for the struggles among Great Powers. Fate was particularly harsh on the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Situated between two traditionally expansionist powers—Germany and Russia—they managed a precarious independence during the interwar period. As long as their neighboring colossi were weak, or were restrained by other powers, the Baltic states could continue their tenuous national existence. However, once Hitler launched Germany on the path to conquest, the future of the Baltic nations was sealed. Hitler's disruption of the European peace enabled the Soviet Union to exploit the situation.

This study deals with the period between 1918 and 1940, and develops the successful secession of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the former Czarist empire, their brief years of independence, and, finally, their incorporation into the Soviet empire as a consequence of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the outbreak of World War II. The major part of the book is devoted to the 1939-1940 period, the prelude to the Soviet occupation. The author carefully and skillfully discusses the diplomatic maneuvering of Germany and the U.S.S.R., their objectives and methods. The Soviets emerge as the prin-

cipal villain, though the Germans share the responsibility.

The record of Soviet deceit is nowhere more apparent than in the Kremlin's callous disregard of the three treaties of mutual assistance signed with the Baltic states. The lessons, if learned in time, may help other small nations bordering on the Soviet Union preserve their independence.

A.Z.R.

CHINA: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By CHANG-TU Hu in collaboration with Samuel C. Chu, Leslie L. Clark, Jung-pang Lo, and Yuan-li Wu. (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1960. 611 pages, tables, selected bibliography, and index, \$10.00.)

In late 1949 a "bamboo curtain" descended between mainland China and the outside world. Since then, while fundamental transformations of the economy, social structure, and political system have occurred, the West has remained in a state of inordinate ignorance. In an attempt to fill this glaring gap, the HRAF organization undertook a study of China, the sixth in its series on world cultures. The result is a comprehensive, systematic, objective portrait of contemporary Communist China.

The scope of the book is kaleidoscopic. There are 24 chapters devoted to such subjects as: the culture and the society; geography and population; ethnic minorities; language; religion; social organization; family; dynamics of political behavior; theory and structure of government; diffusion and control of information; foreign relations; agriculture; industry; education; science and technology; and national attitudes. One seeking to learn about contemporary China would profit greatly by the careful work of the authors. Though several of the chapters are too sketchy, and hence of little worth for the serious student, there is yet much of value in this useful study.

A.Z.R.

Average density of population ranges from less than 5 persons per square mile in Canada, Australia and many colonial areas to 500 or more in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Japan.

—From a Twentieth Century Fund Report.

Current Documents

The South African Issue in the United Nations

On March 21, 1960, Africans taking part in a non-violent demonstration against South African pass laws at Sharpeville clashed with police. The police fired on the crowd; more than 65 persons were killed and hundreds were wounded. The following day when police fired on demonstrators near Cape Town, more Africans were killed and injured. The action of the Union of South Africa was protested by the United States, by the African nations in the United Nations, by India and by many other groups. The Security Council of the United Nations discussed the problem on March 30 and a resolution was introduced by Ecuador the following day. This resolution was accepted by the Security Council April 1. Documentary material on the South African issue in the United Nations follows:

U. S. State Department Statement, March 22

The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people in South Africa will be able to obtain redress for their legitimate grievances by peaceful means.

While the United States as a matter of

practice does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa.

Statement of the Chairman of the African Group at the United Nations, March 23

The Permanent Representatives of the Independent African States met in an emergency session to discuss the most inhuman massacre perpetrated by the Government of the Union of South Africa against the unarmed and peaceful indigenous inhabitants of that country resulting in the loss of many lives and the injury of several hundreds.

The African Group expresses its profound indignation and strongly condemns the barbaric act committed by the armed police of the Union Government and appeals to the conscience of the world to join in this condemnation. The African Group expresses its deep conviction that an immediate end be

put to the inhuman and uncivilized conduct of South Africa in its policy of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa.

The action of the Union of South Africa government is a gross violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and constitutes a threat to the peace and security of Africa and the International Community.

The African Group expresses its deep sympathy to the families of those who sacrificed their lives in defense of their inalienable and natural human rights and conveys its wishes for a speedy recovery to the injured.

Statements in the United Nations

On March 30, United States Delegate to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge addressed the Security Council on South Africa, asking that the question be put on the agenda. Bernardus G. Fourie spoke for South Africa, protesting

Security Council discussion of what South Africa's government termed "purely local disturbances." Indian Delegate C. S. Jha gave his government's view. Texts of these speeches follow:

The United States on South Africa

The United States supported adoption of the agenda and would like to set forth our reasons why.

Our position on this question was expressed clearly in Washington by Secretary of State Herter last Friday. At that time he stated that the United States favored Security Council discussion of this question. In so doing he pointed out that the United States has followed the same policy on the discussion of apartheid in the General Assembly for the last five years.

Since various comments have been made on the question of competence, let me state briefly our view of this matter.

The United States views on the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) of the Charter have been clearly established. I myself stated in the discussion of the question of Tibet at the last session of the General Assembly: "In the years since the establishment of the United Nations certain principles and rules concerning the application of Article 2, Paragraph 7, have emerged. It has become established, for example, that inscription, and then discussion, of an agenda item do not constitute intervention in matters which lie essentially within domestic jurisdiction." We hold the same view with respect to the Security Council that we do in the General Assembly.

When a question such as the present one is involved, Article 2 (7) must be read in the light of Articles 55 and 56.

Under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. During the thirteenth General Assembly the United States representative in the Special Political Committee, Mr. George Harrison, expressed United States policy on these articles in connection with the apartheid discussions on October 16, 1958:

No member of this organization could justi-

fably be excused from endeavoring to fulfill it. We believe that the United Nations can legitimately call attention to policies of member governments that appear to be inconsistent with obligations under the Charter and earnestly ask members to abide by the undertakings that they have accepted in signing the Charter.

We all recognize that every nation has the right to regulate its own internal affairs. This is a right acknowledged by Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter. At the same time we must recognize the right—and the obligations—of the United Nations to be concerned with national policies in so far as they affect the world community. This is particularly so in cases where international obligations embodied in the Charter are concerned.

The United States regrets profoundly the tragic loss of life in South Africa. Twenty-nine member states have brought this situation before the Council, stating that they consider it to have grave potentialities for international friction which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. What this means is that in their view this situation is not only within the scope of Articles 55 and 56, but also of Articles 34 and 35. Such widespread concern testifies to the desirability of the Council considering the problem.

Let me say to the members of the Council that the United States approaches this question with no false pride at all. We recognize that many countries, and the United States must be included in that list, cannot be content with the progress which they have made in the field of human rights and that we must continue our efforts as we are doing to provide full equality of opportunity for all of our citizens.

In many countries unsanctioned violations of human rights continue to occur. But we think there is an important distinction between situations where governments are actively promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and situations where governmental policy runs counter to this.

The question we are asked to consider today has its own particular background of geography, racial composition, cultural diversity and economic relationships. Even difficulties of this sort do not relieve a govern-

ment of its obligations, nor can they relieve the United Nations of its responsibilities. We think this question is a proper one for United Nations consideration and therefore supported the adoption of the agenda.

The Union of South Africa Protests

I have been instructed by the South African Government to record a strong protest against the refusal to hear its representative on the request to place this item on the Council's agenda, particularly as this is the first time in the history of the United Nations that the Security Council has decided to consider purely local disturbances within the territory of a member state contrary to the spirit and intention of the relevant articles of the Charter, thereby creating a most dangerous precedent which might in the future recoil also on other member states.

The South African Government's objection to the consideration by the Security Council of this matter is, in the first instance, based on two legal grounds, namely:

Firstly, that the inscription of this item and any subsequent discussion or resolution in regard thereto would be in violation of a basic principle of the Charter upon which the United Nations was founded. This basic principle is enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which has an overriding effect in regard to all the other articles of the Charter.

Secondly, the Union's objection is based on the ground that such action would be in conflict with the terms of a decision unanimously taken and recorded by a plenary session of the San Francisco Conference of 1946 to the following effect:

Nothing contained in Chapter IX of the Charter can be construed as giving authority to the organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states.

In the past some members of the United Nations have, however, considered Article 2 (7) not as excluding debate, but as excluding what is called "intervention."

It has been argued that recent events in South Africa constitute a situation "which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute likely to endanger international peace and security."

The question, therefore, arises how these

possibilities can eventuate. Clearly, Mr. President, there must be at least two parties if there is to be a dispute or if such a situation is to exist. Furthermore, within the framework of the Charter these parties must be sovereign independent states.

Mr. President, I assure the Council that the Union has no intention, or the least desire, of provoking such a dispute or creating such a situation. If, therefore, such a danger does in fact exist, then I submit that the Council should focus its considerations on the actions of the other party or parties trying to create an international dispute and thereby to endanger international peace and prosperity.

However, leaving aside for the moment the legal objections to the consideration of this subject, the question arises immediately, why the anxiety to pick on South Africa?

How many disturbances and riots, leading to a serious loss of life, have occurred during the last twelve months throughout the world, including Africa?

On what grounds, Mr. President, is it now proposed to single out the Union of South Africa? Or am I to assume that all members favoring the placing of this item on the Council's agenda will, when it comes to their turn, willingly submit to the consideration of this Council of their efforts to maintain law and order in their own countries? If it is to be done in the case of South Africa it can be done in the case of all violent disturbances against the authority of all member states. Are members prepared to accept that sort of future for themselves and for the United Nations? Or if they are not willing so to submit themselves, must one then assume that it is simply a case of South Africa being made the whipping boy?

The Union government has already arranged for full judicial inquiries to be made to obtain with utmost speed an official account of the relevant facts. The Government is also considering the appointment of

a commission, with a judge as chairman, to inquire into the contributory factors and to deal with broader aspects.

But even at this early stage the statement about the alleged mass killing of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators, a statement on which the inscription of this question is based, cannot go unchallenged.

The history of the disturbances, as it has thus far been authoritatively established, is as follows.

A splinter organization of extremists had started some time ago to organize a mass demonstration to protest against the carrying of reference books. In passing I might mention that the reference book was instituted when the pass system—which, incidentally, had been in operation for over a century—was abolished in 1952. The reference book consists of:

1. An identity card which, under our laws, applies to male and female of all races—not only to the Bantu.
2. A section of the book makes provision for noting particulars of tax payments, influx control, et cetera.

The latter is a measure designed to counter uncontrolled flocking of unskilled labor from the rural areas to the industrial areas, where, if it is not controlled, it will create tremendous social problems, housing problems and also have a depressing effect on wages.

The essential elements of the reference book are:

- (a) It is intended to afford a means of identification to people, many of whom are unaccustomed to Western life and often illiterate.
- (b) It provides a ready means of identifying Bantu people from other countries and territories who flock to the Union in large numbers, mostly without any passports or identification papers whatever.

By intimidation of and threats to persons who do not belong to the group, the extremists managed to gather a crowd of approximately 20,000 people in a township, Sharpeville, in the Transvaal and a crowd of about 6,000 at Langa, in the Cape Province.

Police were in the areas concerned to exercise normal control, if needed—as is done in all well-ordered societies all over the world when large masses of demonstrators gather.

At Sharpeville some agitators immediately adopted a threatening attitude toward the police. Attempts were made to arrest some of the violators, but the crowd became more belligerent and the police were attacked with a variety of weapons—pangas, axes, iron bars, knives, sticks and firearms. Indeed, shots were fired at the police before the police returned fire in order to defend their own lives and also to forestall what might have led to even greater and more tragic bloodshed.

I need hardly say how deeply the Union Government regrets that there was this tragic loss of life.

The action that the police were forced to take must be seen against a background not known to many people outside South Africa but nevertheless a background essential to these events. Not two months before the latest tragedy, a group of nine policemen (four white and five nonwhite) were brutally battered to death by a so-called “unarmed” peaceful group.

On another occasion a party of five police (three white and two nonwhite) were engaged in collecting and destroying about thirty tons of the narcotic here known as marijuana, which had been collected in a routine inspection. While they were destroying the marijuana they were set upon by an angry mob which had gathered, and all five police were battered to death and their bodies mutilated by a mob armed with sticks and axes.

I am referring to these incidents merely to point out to members of the Council that while it is easy, when 10,000 miles removed, to criticize the authorities for having used firearms on this occasion, it is indeed asking too much of a small group of policemen to commit suicide—to stand by idly awaiting their turn to be stoned to death.

No government can allow hundreds of thousands of its citizens to be intimidated by extremists, as the Bantu in South Africa often are; to be threatened with the most dire consequences if they proceed with their daily occupations and disobey the instructions of this militant group referred to.

I may add that the demonstrators, far from being peaceful, as so many believe, in fact engaged in looting, arson, destruction of

property, including their own churches and schools and clinics. They cut telephone wires, set buildings on fire, murdered a colored driver and set his car on fire and stoned civilian people unconnected with the riots. Among those were four nurses.

This past Monday, Mr. President, was ordered by the extremists to be a day of mourning. But what was it in fact? Merely a repetition of the previous violence, plundering and senseless destruction of social and educational institutions which are there for the benefits of the Bantu themselves. But the extremists do not mind what they destroy, as long as they do destroy.

Members of the Council may also be interested in certain pamphlets which, according to press reports, were distributed by those behind the riots in Johannesburg. One, for example, says, and I quote it as reported:

The present capitalistic South African State must be completely destroyed and a people's state must be built up. Our comrades would want that we wrest the country from our oppressors with armed force and that after victory we march on to the establishment of the South African People's Republic. Workers of the world unite!

One of the most important principles involved in this matter which we are discussing, Mr. President, is the question of the observance of the law of the land. The point at

issue is not whether there is agreement or disagreement with any particular law. The point at issue is that the law must be enforced despite disagreement, and no government worthy of the name could abdicate from or share its responsibility in such enforcement. If such abdication or sharing does take place, chaos will undoubtedly result and rule by the mob will take place of rule by the government.

Therefore, if by word or deed, or even gesture, this Council disassociates itself from this vital principle of constitutional government, namely the enforcement of the law of the land, a step will have been taken the consequences of which cannot be foreseen.

Mr. President, it is my government's belief that the annual discussion of the racial problems of South Africa since 1946 has helped to inflame the situation there. It would be even more serious if the present discussion in the Council were to embolden the agitators or serve as incitement to further demonstrations and rioting in South Africa, with subsequent attacks by rioters not only on members of the police but also the mass of peaceful citizens of all races trying to carry on a normal life. I am instructed to say that if this were to be the result the blame will rest squarely on the shoulders of the Security Council.

The Indian Delegate Comments

The menace of the situation has mounted up to the point of wholesale and open conflict; South Africa has become a cauldron of racial hatred and violence; according to newspaper reports many white people of South Africa, no doubt with the connivance of the government, are arming themselves to the teeth. They are buying guns and ammunition in hundreds; the acquisition and possession of the same, be it noted, is prohibited to the African people of South Africa.

You have a situation replete with all the ingredients of a terrible explosion—the determination of the African people to vindicate

their fundamental rights; the determination of the government to maintain its racial policies; the determination of the white people of South Africa to use arms against the Africans to preserve their privileged position of a master race which their leaders in and out of Government have deluded them into believing; and last but not least the anger and humiliation felt by hundreds of millions of people on the African continent and by nonwhite peoples everywhere. Who can then blame us for seeking the intervention of the Security Council to prevent such an explosion?

The Security Council Adopts a Draft Resolution on South Africa

The Security Council, having considered the complaint of twenty-nine member states

concerning "the situation arising out of the large-scale killings of unarmed and peaceful

demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa."

Recognizing that such a situation has been brought about by the racial policies of the government of the Union of South Africa and the continued disregard by that Government of the resolutions of the General Assembly calling upon it to revise its policies and bring them into conformity with its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter,

Taking into account the strong feelings and grave concern aroused among Governments and peoples of the world by the happenings in the Union of South Africa,

1. Recognizes that the situation in the Union of South Africa is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security,

2. Deplores that the recent disturbances in

the Union of South Africa should have led to the loss of life of so many Africans and extends to the families of the victims its deepest sympathies,

3. Deplores the policies and actions of the Government of the Union of South Africa which have given rise to the present situation,

4. Calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality in order to ensure that the present situation does not continue or recur and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination,

5. Requests the Secretary General, in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter and to report to the Security Council whenever necessary and appropriate.

Additional Statement by the Union of South Africa

On April 1, the Union of South Africa elaborated on its previous statement (see above) before the United Nations Security Council. The text of this statement, made immediately prior to the adoption of the Ecuadorean resolution, follows:

Since my original statement a great deal has been said about the scope of Article 2, Paragraph 7. None of the arguments used in any way invalidates the South African Government's contention that the council is precluded by this article from considering the South African Government's efforts to maintain internal law and order. I am therefore instructed to record once again our protest against this disregard of Article 2, Paragraph 7.

It has been argued that the council is justified in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 in considering this question. It will be recalled that I dealt with this aspect in my opening statement.

I do not wish to reiterate what I then stated. I wish to emphasize however, that it is clear from Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter that the council is empowered to deal only with disputes or situations, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Furthermore, Article 33 makes it clear that there must be more than one party to a

dispute and there can be no doubt at all that the relevant articles of the Charter envisage disputes or situations arising between states and countries, and that purely internal situations are excluded.

If this were not so any state would be enabled, simply by claiming that internal disturbances in another state are likely to create a situation endangering international peace, to bring such domestic matters before the council. Such a procedure will leave no state immune to outside intervention in its internal affairs and can lead to chaos in international life.

I cannot see how, if a state or group of states disapprove of the internal policy of another state, this can be used as an argument that a threat to the international peace, as envisaged in the Charter, does exist.

It is hardly possible for any state not to disagree with some aspects of the internal policies of other states. Such disagreement might exist even between major powers. Such disagreement could extend to most important and serious matters of policy.

Must this henceforth be interpreted to

mean that Council action can be instituted on the grounds that such disagreement constitutes a dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security?

No. The way the functions of the Security Council are defined in Articles 34 and 35 makes it obvious that the council has the right to discuss only disturbances and situations arising directly between sovereign states themselves.

The council's decision to discuss the disturbances in South Africa is unprecedented and I am instructed once more to put the pertinent question why similar action has not been taken in regard to equally serious disturbances in many other parts of the world.

If South Africa, for example, were to bring any of these matters to the council for consideration, would its request also be acceded to?

As the Government of India is one of the group of twenty-nine countries which asked the council to take up this question, I may perhaps be permitted to ask why the serious civil disturbances that took place in India, in which a large number of people were killed and wounded, never came before the council.

I can enumerate a long list of such disturbances in practically all parts of the world. The facts are, however, known to all members around this council table and need no further elaboration.

In the circumstances it is only natural for

South Africa to ask whether the council is henceforth to have a double standard of conduct and justice.

In the circumstances, I have been instructed to state that the Union Government would regard any resolution by the Council in regard to the local disturbances which have taken place in South Africa in a serious light.

I am also to reiterate what I stated during the Council's first meeting—namely, that if any further bloodshed in South Africa should follow from a decision that might be taken here, the Security Council would have to accept its full share of responsibility.

In conclusion I should like to place one aspect of the situation in its true perspective. The representative of the Soviet Union stated that, and I hope I am quoting him correctly.

The South African authorities have embarked on a course of a mass destruction of people of other races.

I have already stated how greatly the Union Government regrets the loss of life that has occurred—a loss up to now, I believe, of seventy-three persons.

I must, however, pose the question: "If this constitutes the mass destruction of other races, how would the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union describe the loss of life running into hundreds of thousands, elsewhere?" I hope he feels equally strongly about such loss of life.

Tunisian Statement

... This is a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Union of South Africa, but not exclusively within its jurisdiction. The situation endangers international peace and security and falls, therefore, also within the jurisdiction and competence of the Security Council. We must, therefore, act.

My delegation considers that the situation before us, its gravity and the fact that, for a number of consecutive sessions of the General Assembly, the Union of South Africa has ignored the appeals of the Assembly, fully warrant the Council's acting more effectively than would be the case under the very generous provisions embodied in this draft resolution.

However, this does not as yet seem possi-

ble. The Ecuadorean draft resolution does not seem to us to be fully consonant with the gravity of the situation or with the fact that world conscience, which still has faith in our work, expects a great deal more from our debates.

In its draft resolution the Ecuadorean delegation has generously expressed the hope that if the text were adopted by the Security Council that would constitute an appropriate measure leading to the desired solution.

We cannot thwart that hope, and that is why my delegation will not oppose the draft resolution. We do consider, however, that it represents the bare minimum compatible with the Council's responsibilities and with the great seriousness of the existing situation.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of April, 1960, to provide a day-to-day summary of world affairs.

The Month In Review

INTERNATIONAL

African States

April 9—Representatives of 20 African states and territories meet in Accra to discuss "positive action for peace and security in Africa."

April 11—Some 300 delegates from African and Asian nations meet in Conakry, Guinea, to discuss a resolution asking for independence for all African countries by 1962. Large delegations arrive from the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.

April 15—The 50-nation African-Asian Solidarity Conference closes with a condemnation of South Africa.

Berlin Crisis

April 2—A spokesman for the U.S. State Department, William D. Blair, Jr., makes an authorized statement that the U.S.S.R. cannot abrogate Western rights in Berlin by signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Berlin's status can only be altered by the consent of the Big Four Powers.

April 4—Premier Khrushchev declares that he will try to work out a Berlin agreement acceptable to both sides. However, if no such agreement is forthcoming, the Soviet Union and its satellites will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

April 5—West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt announces that the city Senate will convene to discuss the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether West Berliners support continuation of Allied occupation.

April 6—The Senate declares that a plebiscite before the Paris summit meeting in May is possible if desired by West Germany and the three Western Powers.

April 12—The foreign ministers of the U.S., Britain and France confer in Washington on Allied summit policy. They urge that problems be solved "by negotiations and not by force or unilateral action."

April 13—Western foreign ministers are re-

ported to have reached unanimity on summit policy. Sources disclose that the Western plans will include U.N. or Four Power supervised elections as the basis for reuniting East and West Berlin. It is also revealed that the foreign ministers have agreed on a disarmament plan to present to the Soviet Union at the May summit talk.

At their closing session, foreign ministers of the Western powers meeting in Washington confer with Nato Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak. It is reported that the Western ministers have not ironed out differences in approach to a Berlin settlement.

April 19—U.S. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon declares that the U.S. will not yield to Soviet pressures on Berlin; West German freedom will not be risked. He urges an interim Berlin agreement preserving Western rights in the city.

April 25—Soviet Premier Khrushchev says that a separate Soviet peace treaty with East Germany would terminate Allied entry rights into West Berlin "by air, land or water." He warns that any Allied attempt to maintain its rights in Berlin by force will be matched by Soviet force.

April 27—U.S. President Eisenhower reaffirms that Western troops will not evacuate West Berlin.

Disarmament

April 1—The U.S. delegation at the Geneva disarmament conference warns the Russians that it may soon be too late to prevent the placing of nuclear bombs in orbit around the earth. Fredrick Eaton of the U.S. notes that 30 inspectors could watch all launching sites in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and prevent this danger.

April 4—The Soviet delegation says that an agreement prohibiting the using of space satellites for nuclear bombs must be linked with the liquidation of U.S. bases

overseas, so called "alien" military bases. April 5—Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev's plan for complete disarmament is rejected by the West.

April 7—Russian delegate Valerian A. Zorin rejects the Western plan for gradual disarmament. He suggests a fresh start for disarmament negotiations.

April 13—French delegate Jules Moch warns that other nations may produce nuclear weapons.

April 14—The U.S.S.R. accepts the U.S. suggestion for a two-day scientific meeting to discuss nuclear test detection.

The U.S. says it will stop nuclear bomb production and station international inspectors at all nuclear plants if the U.S.S.R. will do likewise.

April 21—The U.S. offers a suggestion for setting up a method of reducing Russian and American armed forces. International inspection teams would make on-the-spot checks and perform other inspection functions.

April 21—In a panel discussion before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress, American scientists testify that instead of 21 inspection stations in the U.S.S.R., some 600 would be needed for adequate inspection, because of improvements in the art of concealing nuclear tests since the scientific conference of 1958 worked out the figure of 21 stations in the U.S.S.R.

April 22—Speaking for the United States, Fredrick Eaton charges the Soviet Union with an "obsessive emphasis upon secrecy."

April 29—The 10-nation disarmament conference adjourns after 32 fruitless meetings until after the summit conference. The conference will resume meetings June 7.

International Court of Justice

April 12—The International Court rules that in 1954 India was justified in refusing to allow Portuguese passage to two Portuguese enclaves within India while riots were in process. No ruling is made on the Portuguese right of passage, but only on the legal requirement that Portugal must receive Indian permission for each passage of troops or munitions.

Latin America

April 30—The Central American Economic Cooperation Committee (a sub-group of the U.N. Economic Committee for Latin America) at the close of its "extraordinary meeting" of the finance ministers of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica agrees to implement the free trade treaty among the countries of the isthmus. The conference approves a plan to open a tripartite pact to include Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The Isthmian Free Trade Treaty which became effective in June, 1959, has been threatened by a tripartite, free trade pact signed by Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador in February.

Law of the Sea Conference

April 26—At Geneva, an effort to reach a compromise on territorial sea and fishing rights fails to pass by one vote. The vote is 54-28 for a U.S.-Canadian compromise formula, less than the two-thirds necessary for adoption. The traditional three-mile territorial sea limit will be followed by the U.S. in the absence of other agreement.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

April 1—After a meeting of 15 defense ministers, Nato's military advisers are requested to find a place within the Nato area where West Germany can train and store supplies and to reevaluate Nato's ability to withstand an initial attack.

United Nations

April 1—The Security Council adopts a moderate resolution "deploring" South African violence and asks Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to talk to the South African government about racial difficulties.

April 2—British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd says that the U.N. resolution is "obvious interference" in South African affairs.

April 13—The U.S. and the Sudan suggest that "special efforts" should be made by the U.N. Economic and Social Council to give newly independent African states technical assistance.

April 14—Because only 36 out of the 82 members of the U.N. favored it, the U.N. refuses to call a special General Assembly

session on French atomic tests in the Sahara. The request was made by 22 Asian and African states.

West Europe

April 5—The West German government agrees to call for restudy of the plan for speeding up the Common Market tariff program.

April 20—U.S. Ambassador to Nato W. Randolph Burgess, Britain's Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Bernard Clappier of France and Xenophon Zolotas of Greece propose a draft convention for a new Atlantic economic organization. The new grouping would be called the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and would provide for full participation of the U.S. and Canada with the 18 members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The new organization would focus on economic development in Asia and Africa.

BELGIUM

Belgian Congo

April 4—A state of emergency in Kasai Province in the Belgian Congo, in effect since January, is lifted.

April 26—A conference of Belgian-Congolese leaders opens in Brussels. Delegates are addressed by Premier Gaston Eyskens and Deputy Premier Albert Lilar.

Ruanda-Urundi

April 5—Suggestions by a United Nations mission investigating unrest in Ruanda-Urundi to alleviate the situation there are reported.

BRAZIL

April 11—Brazil declares that it is soliciting support from other South American republics for a joint statement criticizing South African apartheid.

April 21—Brasilia is declared the new capital of Brazil.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Australia

April 5—Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies says he thinks the South African question will be discussed at the coming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference; he will attend.

Ceylon

April 1—Prime Minister Dudley Senanyake fails to win support from the 15-man Tamil parliamentary bloc.

April 6—Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke opens Parliament and reaffirms Ceylon's adherence to strict neutrality.

April 14—Six opposition parties ask for Senanyake's resignation. The coalition has a majority of one in the 155-seat legislature.

April 22—Senanyake's government falls on a no confidence parliamentary vote.

April 23—Goonetilleke dissolves parliament and calls for general elections July 20.

Ghana

April 2—Ghana recalls Ambassador Joseph E. Jantuah from Paris in protest against a second French atomic bomb test.

April 7—Ghana tightens money transfer regulations in protest against the French atomic explosion.

April 21—Ghana releases frozen French assets.

April 22—Opposition United party presidential candidate Joseph B. Danquah says he has asked for a postponement of tomorrow's election because of a "widespread campaign of terror and intimidation."

April 23—Police reinforcements supervise the second stage of an election for president and a plebiscite on the new Constitution.

Great Britain

April 2—A British engineering firm submits plans to the Channel Tunnel Study Group for a bridge across the English Channel, at a cost of some \$560 million.

April 4—Derick Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor of the Exchequer, offers Parliament a "cautious" and "unexciting" budget for 1960-1961.

April 5—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warns against action on South Africa that might make for a Commonwealth crisis.

April 8—The Commons unanimously adopts a resolution "deploring" *apartheid* in South Africa.

April 13—Minister of Defense Harold Watkinson tells Commons that the development of the Blue Streak ballistic missile has been dropped.

April 16—In an annual protest against the hydrogen bomb, a crowd of about 75,000 people demonstrate against nuclear weapons.

April 20—The Channel Tunnel Study Group recommends three parallel tunnels between Britain and France, after a two and a half year study.

April 25—A group of British, French and American concerns has offered to construct a cross Channel tunnel and to fix a price for the job.

India

April 5—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is warned by 62 members of Parliament not to surrender Indian territory at the forthcoming talks with Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai.

April 9—India reveals the establishment of a free trade zone at Kandla on the west coast, to aid in the industrial development of western India.

Parliament votes \$571,745,000 for defense in the next fiscal year.

April 23—Parliament approves legislation partitioning Bombay, India's largest state, thus increasing the number of Indian states to 15. Northern Bombay will become the state of Gujarat; the rest of Bombay will be known as Maharashtra. The split will be formalized May 1.

Malaya

April 1—The Paramount Ruler of Malaya, Tuanku Abdul Rahman, dies in his sleep.

April 14—Sultan Sir Hisamuddin Alam Shah is elected Paramount Ruler by the chiefs of the nine Malay states.

April 16—Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman reveals that the 12-year old state of emergency will be ended shortly; he predicts that subversive Communist activities will be intensified now that the shooting war against Malayan terrorists is ending.

Union of South Africa

April 1—Police fire on African rioters in Durban, killing three.

April 5—Hungry Africans end their strike against *apartheid* policies.

April 6—Pass law requirements are reactivated.

April 7—Some 1,500 Africans are arrested at Nyanga township and screened at a police station.

April 8—At Johannesburg, hundreds of Africans are seized; the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress are banned for a year.

April 9—Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd is shot and severely wounded by a wealthy white European planter.

April 12—Minister of the Interior Thomas Naude says the Government plans a program to attract white immigrants.

April 16—The Government says that Africans who stop work face dismissal and banishment to remote reserves.

April 18—Some 400 Africans are arrested on the eve of a protest strike.

April 19—A threatened week-long African protest strike fails to materialize.

April 23—Verwoerd meets with a Cabinet member for the first time since he was wounded.

April 25—Police reveal that in the past month more than 4,500 Africans have been arrested; the number jailed is reported at 1,650.

April 27—Police continue mass raids and report that more than 500 persons have been arrested in the past two days.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Cyprus

April 2—Archbishop Makarios leaves a conference with British negotiators after a 45 minute talk.

April 6—The draft for the Cyprus constitution is signed by representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments, Greek and Turkish Cypriotes and a Swiss legal adviser.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

April 1—Hastings K. Banda, leader of the Nyasaland African National Congress, is released after a year's detention as a subversive.

April 14—British Secretary of State for the Colonies Iain Macleod says that a constitutional conference on Nyasaland will be held this summer. Most of Nyasaland leader Hastings K. Banda's associates will be released from jail before the conference.

April 23—Prime Minister of Southern Rh-

desia Edgar Whithead arrives in London to talk about proposed constitutional changes.

Nigeria

April 2—The Government announces import duty changes: duties are increased on materials used in the manufacture of perfume, outboard motors and film; other products including iron and steel in primary form and tires for earth moving equipment are duty free.

April 5—Nigeria suspends trade with South Africa.

April 16—Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa suggests that Nigerians should encourage inter-tribal marriages and inter-regional education to unify the country.

Sierra Leone

April 22—The judicial and legal aspects of the Sierra Leone move toward independence are settled at a London conference.

BURMA

April 4—U Nu is elected premier by the Parliament, succeeding General Ne Win. Ne Win assumed the premiership in 1958, when U Nu stepped aside to allow him to come to power to restore order to the nation.

April 15—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai arrives in Burma for a 4-day visit.

CAMBODIA

April 3—King Norodom Suramarit dies.

April 12—Premier Norodom Sihanouk and his Cabinet resign following the King's death.

April 13—Premier Sihanouk refuses to form a new government.

April 18—Pho Proeung is named the new premier.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

April 4—It is reported from the Nepalese capital that Communist China has claimed Mount Everest, world's highest mountain, on the Tibetan-Nepalese border.

April 6—Vice-Premier Tan Chen-lin in an address to the National People's Congress, as reported by *Hsinhua* (official press agency), announces that some 400 million rural people are serviced by 3.9 million

community dining rooms; that there are now 24,000 rural collectives.

April 10—A \$28 billion budget for 1960 is approved.

April 16—The Communist party paper, *Jen-min Jihpao*, reports that mechanical rice transplanters will be installed on 70 per cent of the rice fields. Some 4.5 million mechanical transplanters will replace hand transplanting.

April 19—Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai arrives in India to discuss disagreement over a common border area.

April 25—Chou and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issue a joint communiqué after 6 days of meetings to discuss frontier disputes in the provinces of Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency. The joint statement signals a deadlock in negotiating a border settlement; the two leaders plan to reopen talks in June.

April 26—In a news conference early this morning before his departure, the Red Chinese Premier is reported to have stated that Red China will not recognize the McMahon Line as the Indian-Chinese border.

COLOMBIA

April 4—President Alberto Lleras Camargo arrives in Washington for a 2-week visit to the U.S. He is greeted by U.S. President Eisenhower.

April 6—President Lleras addresses the U.S. Congress. He tells congressmen of the vital role that U.S. foreign aid can play in the fight for democracy provided it is not "too late or too little."

CUBA

April 1—It is announced that Cuba and Poland have agreed on a trade exchange. Poland will supply Cuba with heavy industrial equipment, ships, helicopters and so forth. Cuba will send Poland food-stuffs and metal ores. (See also *Poland*.)

April 8—in an unsigned letter on behalf of U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower to the university students' federation in Chile, the President accuses Cuban Premier Fidel Castro of failing to live up to his revolutionary ideals.

April 9—Havana newspapers carry protests against Eisenhower's letter criticizing the Castro regime.

April 10—It is reported that a proclamation has been issued by the Movement of Revolutionary Recovery (M.R.R.), urging Cubans to fight the Castro regime and establish democracy in Cuba. The new movement is composed of dissidents who once fought with Castro's revolutionary band.

April 11—In one of three notes to the Cuban government, the U.S. declares that the establishment of Castro's government in 1959 has only led to greater tensions in the Caribbean.

April 13—Civilian militiamen are sent to reinforce government troops under Premier Castro fighting rebel dissidents led by Captain Manolo Beaton.

April 15—It is reported that some 5000 troops are now in Sierra Maestra to assist Premier Castro in rounding up rebel dissidents.

April 18—Castro charges that U.S. personnel at the Guantanamo Naval Base are working with dissident elements for the overthrow of his regime.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

April 1—Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, dictator of the Dominican Republic, resigns as head and member of the Dominican party, which has supported him for 30 years. Trujillo declares that no one will attempt to organize a new party while he is in the Dominican party. The Generalissimo is reported anxious to liberalize his regime.

FRANCE

April 1—French President Charles de Gaulle confers with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, who is visiting in France.

France announces that it has successfully detonated its second atomic bomb of "limited power" at Reggan.

April 2—A communique is issued by de Gaulle and Khrushchev concluding the two leaders' talks. Although they declare that settlement of the German situation will aid world peace, no agreement is reached on working it out; they also agree on joint cooperation in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is announced that de Gaulle has accepted an invitation to the Soviet Union.

April 4—France announces to the U.N. that

it does not plan any further nuclear testing.

April 5—President de Gaulle is welcomed by Queen Elizabeth II upon his arrival in London.

April 6—De Gaulle confers with British Prime Minister Macmillan on a joint policy for the forthcoming summit talks in May.

April 7—In an address to the British Parliament, de Gaulle declares that he is seeking an end to nuclear weapons. He asserts that France will halt nuclear testing when Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reach an agreement on disarmament.

Security troops are called out to disperse rioting farmers. Farmers have been agitating because farm prices have not kept pace with industrial prices.

April 8—De Gaulle returns to Paris from London.

April 15—It is reported that the U.S. will deliver 66 pounds of uranium 235 to France for the development of an atomic submarine reactor.

April 18—President de Gaulle arrives in Canada for talks with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.

The Official Journal reports an ordinance in which the French Cabinet empowered itself to declare a state of emergency.

April 22—President de Gaulle arrives in Washington and is greeted by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The two leaders begin talks.

April 23—In a news conference, de Gaulle expresses little hope for a summit settlement on the German question if the basic positions of both East and West remain unchanged. De Gaulle tells newsmen that the Big Powers at the summit should initiate a relaxation of the cold war by arriving at a disarmament pact.

April 24—De Gaulle and Eisenhower issue a joint statement after talks at Camp David (Maryland); they are in agreement on policy for a summit talk.

April 25—De Gaulle addresses a joint session of the U.S. Congress, cautioning it that the East-West powers must agree on easing world tension if nuclear catastrophe is to be avoided.

The Gaullist Union for the New Re-

public ousts one of its founders, Jacques Soustelle, who was a strong supporter of General de Gaulle and a firm believer in Algeria's integration with France. April 26—De Gaulle is given a rousing welcome by New Yorkers.

April 27—De Gaulle arrives in San Francisco, on his tour of the U.S.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

April 11—The Algerian Provisional Government announces that it is soliciting volunteers, no matter what nationality, to assist in the war against France.

April 12—French Premier Michel Debré tells Algerians that if they vote for independence from France, Algeria will be partitioned to provide a place for those who wish to remain French citizens.

Debré also initiates a Supreme Council for Social Promotion, which will direct and establish educational centers in Algeria.

April 14—The French Cabinet orders changes in the military command in Algeria.

April 23—Lieutenant General Jean Crepin begins his duties as the new French Commander in Chief in Algeria.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE Cameroon

April 10—The first national election is held.

April 20—The Cameroon Union party, led by Premier Ahmadou Ahidjo, won 60 of the 100 National Assembly seats. The Cameroon People's Union took 22 seats.

Mali, Federation of

April 4—France and the 2 states composing the Mali Federation—Senegal and Sudan—sign an accord granting full sovereignty to Mali.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (EAST)

April 14—The East German news agency, A.D.N., announces that East Germany has achieved complete land collectivization.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

April 1—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer leaves Japan after a week-long

visit. Adenauer and Japanese Premier Nobusuke Kishi issue a joint statement urging "lasting peace."

April 6—The West German government delivers a note to Soviet leaders in Moscow protesting Soviet Premier Khrushchev's criticisms of West Germany during his trip through France in March.

Foreign Minister Heinrich Von Brentano, under parliamentary questioning, asserts that the possibility of establishing depot bases in Spain has not been altogether abandoned.

April 8—Dr. Theodor Oberlaender, Minister of Refugees, announces that he will take a 3-week leave. Christian Democratic and Socialist parties later reveal that Oberlaender will not return to his post. The Socialists have waged a firm battle to remove Oberlaender whom they charge is an ex-Nazi and an accomplice in mass killings in Poland in 1941.

April 21—Refugee Minister Oberlaender requests a parliamentary investigation of charges made against him; he offers to resign after the investigation.

April 22—Although still bound by an Allied order to sell his coal and steel holdings, Alfred Krupp merges his coal and steel mill companies into the Huettenund Bergwerke Rheinhausen A.G.

April 27—Adenauer addresses his party's annual meeting; he is re-elected chairman.

INDONESIA

April 1—President Sukarno of Indonesia departs on a 2-month tour abroad.

April 16—In Hungary, Sukarno states that the Communist bloc and the Afro-Asian nations share "the same ideals."

April 23—Sukarno meets with U.A.R. President Nasser in Cairo.

IRAQ

April 8—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, arrives in Iraq.

April 16—Mikoyan flies back to Moscow, ending a week's visit.

ISRAEL (See also U.A.R.)

April 9—Israel announces it will continue to send cargoes through the Suez.

ITALY

April 8—By a vote of 300 to 293, Premier Fernando Tambroni's new government is

approved by the Chamber of Deputies.

April 9—Two Cabinet ministers resign to protest neo-Fascist votes cast in support of the Tambroni Cabinet. The Neo-Fascists gave the Christian Democratic Cabinet an essential 24 votes for its majority.

April 11—Tambroni and his Cabinet resign.

April 14—Amintore Fanfani agrees to try to form a new government to end the 50-day Cabinet crisis.

April 16—It is reported that The Vatican disapproves of Fanfani's attempts to form a government based on an alliance with Leftist parties.

April 22—Fanfani ends attempts to form a Cabinet.

April 23—President Giovanni Gronchi refuses Tambroni's resignation and orders him to go before the Senate for a vote of confidence.

April 27—Tambroni asks the Senate for confirmation.

JAPAN

April 4—Japan and South Korea agree to resume trade, interrupted when Japan repatriated Korean nationals to North Korea.

April 23—Japan protests Soviet criticisms of Japan's security pact with the U.S.

April 26—A protest march is staged by 6000 university students on the Japanese Diet, where the new Japanese-U.S. security treaty is being considered for ratification.

KOREA, SOUTH

April 11—It is reported that rioting broke out last night at Masan.

April 12—10,000 rioters, demonstrating against President Syngman Rhee's government, are dispersed by police.

April 13—Hundreds are arrested as rioting in Masan continues for the third day.

April 19—The U.S. tells South Korean leaders that the Rhee government has been "repressive" and undemocratic.

Eighty persons are reported killed as the wave of rioting (since presidential elections on March 16) flares.

April 20—Tanks and troops restore order to Seoul after violent rioting yesterday.

April 21—It is reported that Rhee's government has resigned.

It is reported that the U.S. is advising Rhee to introduce political reforms, in-

cluding a new election to the vice-presidency. The U.S. also urges that Rhee clamp down on police excesses in dealing with the rioters.

It is reported that Rhee has called together his country's elder statesmen to confer on the recent crisis.

It is reported that Rhee will re-organize his government to allow for a system of Cabinet responsibility and a president as figurehead.

Vice-President John M. Chang asks Rhee to step down from the presidency. Chang was defeated by Vice-President elect Lee Ki Poong in the March election.

April 24—Opposition leaders declare that new elections must be held before consideration can be given to establishing a new cabinet-type government.

April 25—Rhee's address yesterday to the Korean people is reported: Rhee says he will divorce himself from the Liberal party and serve only as "Chief Executive." Opposition party leaders call for Rhee's resignation and new presidential elections.

April 26—Rhee offers to resign because of a new wave of demonstrations yesterday. Rhee also asks for Lee's resignation, and announces he will call new elections.

The U.S. embassy in Korea releases a statement cautioning Rhee's government against "temporizing."

The National Assembly in a resolution asks for Rhee's resignation. The Assembly also begins work on governmental reform.

April 27—Rhee offers his resignation.

April 28—Huh Chung, acting president as of yesterday, says he will set his efforts to end Korea's ills. He announces that he will eliminate waste in the U.S. aid program to Korea.

Lee Ki Poong, former vice-president elect, his wife and 2 sons commit suicide.

Huh Chung begins to appoint a Cabinet.

April 30—Huh Chung accepts the resignations of Korea's 9 provincial governors and 21 national police force officers.

LAOS

April 24—Laotians vote for a new National Assembly.

April 28—Incomplete returns give the conservative, pro-government candidates 46

of the 59 seats; Leftist candidates are defeated.

April 30—Complete returns for 51 seats give the victory to all pro-government candidates; two seats are still in dispute. The remaining 6 seats of the 59-man parliament will be contested May 8 in run-off elections.

MOROCCO

April 16—It is reported that the Moroccan foreign ministry has protested to France over an attack by French planes on Moroccan soil in an offensive two days ago against Algerian nationalists.

April 19—Tangier, an international zone, is integrated economically with Morocco.

April 21—Morocco announces it will issue a new currency, replacing the franc with the dirham. There will be approximately 5 dirhams to the dollar.

NEPAL

April 26—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai arrives in Nepal where he is greeted by signs that "Everest is ours." Red China has laid claim to this mountain on the Nepalese-Tibetan border.

April 27—King Mahendra and Queen Ratna of Nepal arrive in the U.S. for a state visit.

April 28—Chou declares that his country has not claimed Everest. He goes on to say that Red China will agree to joint ownership of Mount Everest with Nepal.

King Mahendra addresses the U.S. Congress, upholding Nepalese neutralism.

PARAGUAY

April 29—Rebels invading Paraguay from Argentina are in possession of Mayor Otano, as confirmed by the Ministry of the Interior.

POLAND

April 2—U.S. officials are reported to have indicated that Poland's recent trade agreement with Cuba to send ships and other industrial equipment to the Caribbean may lead to cuts in U.S. aid to Poland. (See also *Cuba*.)

April 28—It is reported that police have dispersed rioters demonstrating in Nowa Huta, supposedly to protest the removal of a cross at a site marked for a new Catholic church.

TIBET

April 9—The Dalai Lama addresses the Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet and against Colonialism in Asia and Africa meeting in New Delhi. The exiled leader asks for support in freeing his country.

TOGO

April 27—Togo becomes a republic; it had been a U.N. trust territory under French administration.

TUNISIA

April 7—President Habib Bourguiba announces that France will withdraw its troops at posts surrounding the air and naval base at Bizerte. The question of French evacuation of the Bizerte base is still open.

April 15—Bourguiba asserts that he has rejected a French request to order Algerian nationalist troops from Tunisia.

April 24—Tunisia reproves France for violating its border territory in an attack on Algerian rebels.

TURKEY

April 19—Political activities are prohibited for 3 months by a 15-member committee of inquiry.

April 28—Student demonstrations are broken up by police. Martial law is imposed in Istanbul and Ankara. The demonstrations were caused by the Grand National Assembly's establishment of a special committee to investigate the Opposition Republican People's party.

April 29—Crowds shouting for the resignation of Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes are scattered by troops. Martial law is declared for three months.

April 30—Troops make mass arrests of students staging further demonstrations against the Menderes government.

U.S.S.R., THE

April 1—It is revealed that the Soviet Union will give entry visas to former citizens wishing to visit.

April 3—Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev arrives in Moscow after an 11-day tour through France. (See also *France*.)

April 16—In an article in the magazine *Soviet State and Law*, it is disclosed that State Prosecutor Roman A. Rudenko has

asserted that police terrorism is being weeded out, and that "there are now no persons in prison for political reasons."

The Soviet Union, in an exchange pact, agrees to send cement and other products to the Sudan in exchange for cotton and other crops.

April 18—Under the Soviet-U.S. cultural exchange program, the U.S. musical, *My Fair Lady*, opens at the Red Army Theater.

April 21—A Soviet official appeals before the Russo-British Chamber of Trade for increased British purchases from the U.S.S.R.

Tass, Soviet news agency, reports the Lenin prize-winners in science and technology for 1960. Credit for discovering the Van Allen radiation belt circling the earth (first discovered by James A. Van Allen in Iowa) is given to 4 Soviet physicists.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

April 8—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold issues a statement protesting U.A.R. seizure last December of a Greek ship carrying Israeli cement through the Suez Canal. Hammarskjold declares that he will renew efforts to persuade the U.A.R. to allow Suez passage to Israeli ships.

April 10—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India issues a joint statement with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, on a 13-day visit to New Delhi, in support of neutralism.

Nasser and Nehru voice criticisms of the recent racial violence in the Union of South Africa.

A Greek ship held 5 months by U.A.R. authorities sails after its cargo of Israeli cement was unloaded for auction.

April 13—Nasser arrives in Lahore, Pakistan, for a 6-day visit.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

April 15—Officials of the Department of Agriculture reveal that the Department estimates a saving to the Government of some \$98.5 million if reduction of grain storage rates is made effective. The Government paid a single grain storage firm, the C-F-G Grain Company, more than \$23 million in 1959.

April 25—The Agriculture Department esti-

mates a five per cent upswing in farm prices, a bountiful crop, and farmer income about equal to last year's.

Civil Rights (See also Government)

April 25—A consent judgment entered at Memphis, Tennessee, settles a voting rights case by negotiation for the first time: voting discriminations against qualified Negroes in Fayette County, Tennessee, primaries are ended.

The Economy

April 16—The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth headed by Vice-President Richard Nixon issues a Second Interim Report predicting a "great expansion" of the economy in the 1960's.

Foreign Policy

April 1—A Soviet message is received in Washington notifying the U.S. of Russian readiness to negotiate an agreement for regular air service between the two countries.

April 11—Pre-summit meetings begin in Washington; foreign ministers of Britain, France, West Germany and Canada and Nato Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak confer. The Italian foreign minister is delayed.

April 20—Christian Herter asks that "urgent attention" from the Organization of American States be given to the problem of land distribution in Latin America.

April 26—The White House announces that if the President cannot remain at the summit conference more than one week, Vice-President Nixon will replace him there.

April 30—An unpublished letter from Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon to the interim European trade committee chairman reasserts U.S. support for acceleration of the Common Market tariff schedules, according to reports published today.

As a reprisal for American picketing of the Egyptian freighter Cleopatra, tied up in New York since April 13, Egyptian port workers boycott American ships at Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. The Cleopatra is being picketed by the Seafarers International Union to protest Egypt's Israeli boycott.

Government

April 5—Republican congressional leaders, the Secretary of Health, Education and

Welfare, and Vice-President Nixon meet with the President at the White House to discuss a program of subsidized voluntary health insurance for the aged.

April 11—Senator John C. McClellan's Government Operations Committee receives a 10-month stand-by authorization to continue to investigate rackets; Senator McClellan agrees not to ask for continued life for his Select Committee on Improper Activities which expires March 31.

April 19—President Eisenhower offers his personal papers to the Government if they can be deposited and maintained "in perpetuity" at the Eisenhower Presidential Library at Abilene, Kansas.

April 21—Whitney Gilliland is named chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board to replace James Durfee, now a judge of the U.S. Court of Claims.

Courtland D. Perkins' nomination as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force is confirmed.

April 21—The House of Representatives approved 288-95 a compromise Civil Rights Act as passed by the Senate; the bill awaits the President's signature. According to terms of the bill, a new procedure will be established to assure voting rights to Negroes. If a federal court finds that a Negro has been illegally prevented from voting and if his exclusion is found to result from racial discrimination, referees are appointed by the federal court. The Negro then must again try to register to vote in his state. If this attempt fails, the federal referee will enroll him for voting provided he meets his state's qualifications. Among other provisions, states are required to retain their voting records for 22 months after primary and general elections and to make these records available to the Justice Department. Threats or force to block federal court orders are made criminal.

April 27—President Eisenhower confirms the fact that he is replacing William R. Connelly on the Federal Power Commission.

Labor

April 1—Terence F. McShane, F.B.I. special agent, is named a monitor of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, succeeding Lawrence T. Smith.

April 11—President of the Carpenters Union Maurice A. Hutcheson is convicted of con-

tempt of Congress for refusing to answer Senate rackets committee questions without invoking the Fifth Amendment.

April 16—It is revealed in Washington that the total net assets of the United Mine Workers of America come to \$110,315,080, not counting the union's welfare and retirement funds. The financial report is made public under the new labor law that makes such reporting mandatory.

April 22—The President sets up an emergency board to recommend a settlement of the wage dispute between the railroad industry and 11 railroad unions.

Military Policy

April 1—Under the aegis of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (a civilian agency), the U.S. launches a weather satellite into orbit with two television cameras; it is expected that more accurate weather forecasting will now be possible. The new satellite is known as *Tiros I*.

April 4—Thomas S. Power, Chief of the Strategic Air Command, asks Congress for an appropriation seven times as large as the one the President asked for a continuous air alert. An initial appropriation of \$571 million is declared necessary.

April 5—NASA officials admit in Washington that *Tiros I* may work so well that it may photograph military objectives.

April 7—Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates names Herbert F. York to take overall charge of space launching bases, missile sites and radar tracking installations.

April 13—An experimental space lighthouse, *Transit I-B*, is orbited from Cape Canaveral. The navigational satellite is expected to provide more accurate earth navigation.

April 14—William M. Holaday resigns as chairman of the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, as of April 30.

April 14—The first successful underwater launching of a Polaris missile is reported.

April 18—The Defense Department calls for the induction of 5,500 men into the Army for June, the lowest draft call since the start of the Korean War.

April 21—An Air Force Titan intercontinental missile is fired more than 5,000 miles from Cape Canaveral.

April 22—A data capsule is retrieved from the Titan missile fired yesterday.

April 23—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee charges that the Department of Defense has tried to "hush up" a currency black market scandal concerning American military men stationed in Turkey.

April 28—Wernher von Braun, director of the development and operations division of the Huntsville Army Ballistic Missile Agency, says that the super rocket Saturn is ready for a ground test.

April 29—The Navy reveals that a Russian trawler passed close to the Polaris submarine while it was being tested in international waters.

Politics

April 5—In the Wisconsin Democratic presidential primary, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy wins over Minnesota Senator Hubert H. Humphrey with a margin of 106,000 votes; Nixon, running third, shows considerable strength.

April 8—Vice President Nixon says that he favors allowing the U.S. to provide birth control information to nations that want it.

April 13—Nixon polls 716,707 in the Illinois primary, running without opposition.

April 14—A Humphrey aide reveals that Humphrey has reduced his headquarters staff by half since his Wisconsin defeat.

April 26—In the Massachusetts primary, Kennedy receives support from both major parties in write-in ballots.

In the Pennsylvania presidential primary, Nixon and Kennedy receive unusual support.

Segregation

April 5—Lunch counters are integrated in Galveston, Texas, as Negroes and whites sit down together without disturbance.

April 11—In Jackson, Mississippi, Negroes begin to boycott white-owned stores.

April 13—In Little Rock, Arkansas, eight Negro students are arrested for a lunch counter sitdown demonstration.

April 18—Former President Harry S. Truman asserts that Communists are responsible for the lunch counter sitdown demonstrations in the South.

April 19—A bomb explodes at the home of a Negro City Councilman at Nashville, Tennessee; over two thousand Negroes march in protest against police inaction in the face of racial violence.

George Meany, Walter Reuther and other union officials promise to boycott stores with southern chains refusing to serve Negroes at lunch counters. F. W. Woolworth stores are among those subject to boycott.

Supreme Court

April 18—In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court holds that federal courts may not enjoin maritime union picketing of ships flying "flags of convenience" in American ports.

April 25—The court rules 7 to 2 that unfair labor practice charges may not be brought after the expiration of a statutory six-month limit fixed by the National Labor Relations Act even if the offense is claimed to be a continuing one.

The Court agrees to rule on the constitutionality of Sunday blue laws forbidding Sunday business.

VENEZUELA

April 6—The International Monetary Fund announces a \$100 million credit to help offset Venezuela's foreign reserve deficit; before the money will be made available, Venezuela must increase its account in the I.M.F. from its present level of \$15 million to \$150 million.

April 20—It is reported that a rebellion breaking out in Tachira is put down.

April 21—Early this morning, the remaining rebels garrisoned at Fort Bolivar surrender. Retired Air Force General Jesus Maria Castro Leon, leader of the attack, escapes.

April 22—Castro Leon and his 2 aides are captured near the Colombian border.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

April 30—Eighteen Vietnamese leaders, 10 of whom are former government ministers, issue a petition asking President Ngo Dinh Diem to introduce reforms increasing liberty and reducing corruption.

YUGOSLAVIA

April 8—President Tito issues a joint communique with visiting Indonesian President Sukarno declaring that small countries should be represented at summit talks.

April 22—Tito addresses the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Alliance, urging every effort to make the 1961-1965 5-year plan a success.

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